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This paper studies the Great Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  Newspaper 
coverage and policymakers’ statements are used to analyze the views on the inflation process 
that led to the 1970s macroeconomic policies, and the different movement in each country away 
from 1970s views.  I argue that to understand the course of policy in each country, it is crucial to 
use the monetary policy neglect hypothesis, which claims that the Great Inflation occurred 
because policymakers delegated inflation control to nonmonetary devices.  This hypothesis helps 
explain why, unlike Canada, Australia and New Zealand continued to suffer high inflation in the 
mid-1980s.  The delayed disinflation in these countries reflected the continuing importance 
accorded to nonmonetary views of inflation.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Christiano and Gust (2000, p. 21) observe that the Great Inflation of the 1970s took place in 
many countries, and note the desirability of “understanding why it happened and what can be 
done to prevent it happening again.”  In practice, however, examination of the U.S. experience, 
rather than that of other countries, has dominated the literature on the Great Inflation.  In a 
previous paper, I attempted to redress this imbalance by providing a symmetric treatment of the 
Great Inflation in the U.S. and the U.K. (Nelson, 2004).  In the present paper, I extend this 
approach to three other countries that experienced the Great Inflation: Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. 
 
The conclusion in Nelson (2004), based on quantitative evidence, policymakers’ statements, and 
contemporary news coverage from the two countries studied, was that only the monetary policy 
neglect hypothesis could provide a coherent explanation of policy developments in the 1970s.  
This hypothesis contends that monetary policymakers viewed inflation as driven by factors other 
than excess demand, and sometimes combined this view with their own skepticism about 
monetary policy’s ability to affect demand.  This led to the control of inflation being allocated to 
nonmonetary devices.  I also argued that this hypothesis is complementary, in two important 
respects, with Orphanides’ (2003) contention that policymakers’ over-estimates of potential 
output formed a serious source of policy error in the 1970s.  For if policymakers believe inflation 
is a nonmonetary phenomenon, the response of monetary policy to inflation outbreaks is likely to 
be weak, and therefore compound any inflation that results from policy responses to biased 
output-gap estimates.  And since nonmonetary (i.e., cost-push) views of inflation are compatible 
with any combination of inflation and output-gap outcomes, such views provide no mechanism 
for policymakers to learn from inflation outcomes that their estimates of the gap are in error. 
 
The present paper presents further evidence for the monetary policy neglect hypothesis by 
showing that it accounts for monetary policy and inflation developments during the Great 
Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
 
The Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand inflation experiences have been analyzed by 
Debelle (1996) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), so some clarification of my 
differences in coverage with those studies is in order.  Those studies principally focus on the 
decline in inflation in each country in the early 1990s, and on the institutional changes that built 
upon the decline.  By contrast, I am concerned with the views on the inflation process that led to 
the 1970s policies, and the different movement in each country away from 1970s views.  I argue 
that to understand the differences, it is crucial to use the monetary policy neglect hypothesis.  
Canada enjoyed a substantial and sustained fall in inflation from 1982−83 onward;
1 Australia 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
1 The rebound of Canadian inflation late in the 1980s (not studied in this paper) was minor by comparison with this fall, 
justifying Debelle’s (1996) label of it as a “small inflation.”   2
and New Zealand, by contrast, suffered a major rebound of inflation in the mid-1980s.  The 
different outcomes in these countries reflected the continuing importance accorded to 
nonmonetary views of inflation. Only once these countries had decisively accepted monetary 
policy, rather than incomes policy, as the favored way to control inflation, could the institutional 
changes that Debelle (1996) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) document take 
place. 
 
Two other relevant studies are Guttmann (2004) for Australia, and Courchene (1976) for Canada.  
These studies draw, as this paper does, on archival material in the form of contemporary 
newspaper coverage and policymakers’ statements.  The aims of the present paper, however, are 
different from those of these studies.  As far as government policy is concerned, Guttmann’s 
(2004) focus is on the pursuit of monetary targeting in Australia (1976−85).  The present study, 
on the other hand, provides a critical overview—from the perspective that inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon—of Australian government policies, both monetary and nonmonetary, against 
inflation over 1971−91.  Courchene (1976, 1981) is concerned with the conduct of monetary 
policy in Canada in the 1970s, and offers little coverage of the predominantly nonmonetary 
approach to inflation that Canadian policymakers took over that period.  The present paper 
provides such an analysis.  Reflecting the different aims of this paper, the specific archival 
material I employ differs substantially from that in the abovementioned studies. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives a selective graphical and quantitative overview 
of the monetary policy and inflation record in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, while 
Section 3 outlines the monetary policy neglect hypothesis and how I apply it to these countries.  I 
then analyze the details of the policy record during the Great Inflation in Canada (Section 4), 
Australia (Section 5), and New Zealand (Section 6).  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  An Overview of the Great Inflation 
 
Figures 1 to 3 plot four-quarter CPI inflation for Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  The 
increase in Canada’s inflation rate from its 1960s values to its 1981 peak is interrupted by 
declines in 1970−71 and after 1975.  Only the first of these declines, however, is genuine, as the 
second period was characterized by compulsory price controls (see Section 4).  Inflation shifts 
decisively to single digits from late 1982.  Australia (Figure 2) also has lower inflation in the 
1980s than the 1970s, but the improvement is marred by rebounds in 1985−86 and 1988−90, and 
in no quarter over 1973−90 does the rate fall below 5%.   
 
Figure 3 shows why a recent review of monetary policy in New Zealand could confine its 
remarks on the pre-inflation-targeting period to the statement: “The inflation history of New 
Zealand before the 1990s is dismal.” (Svensson, 2001, p. 2).  The temporary improvement in 
inflation over 1982−84 is wholly artificial—reflecting the imposition of a wage-price freeze over   3
that period (see Section 6).  The lack of improvement in inflation performance in the 1980s 
explains why a former Reserve Bank of New Zealand Governor refers to “the Great Inflation of 
the Seventies and Eighties” (Brash, 2002), rather than the 1970s alone.   
 
The poor 1970s performance on inflation in each country is consistent with evidence from 
estimated policy rules (Table 1).  Better inflation performance should go hand-in-hand with a 
stricter monetary policy rule, one element of which is a sizable response of short-term interest 
rates to inflation.  Table 1 is generally in line with the regularity, documented by Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler (2000) for the U.S., that pre-1980s monetary policy rules exhibited weak (below 
unity) responses to inflation.  In New Zealand, for example, the interest-rate response to inflation 
is only about 0.5 for 1966−84, but from 1988 takes a value around the 1.5 recommended by 
Taylor (1993).
2 An exception to this regularity is that, for the 1970s as a whole, the Canadian 
reaction function exhibits a greater than unit response to inflation.
3 As Table 1 also shows, 
however, this result changes if the first and last years of the 1970s are dropped from the sample.  
As it turns out, the treatment of 1971−78 rather than 1970−79 as a single regime is consistent 
with the explanation of the Great Inflation offered in this paper, since 1971−78 was the period 
when nonmonetary views on inflation control had their peak influence on Canadian 
policymaking. 
 
Figures 4 to 6 compare actual short-term interest-rate choices with prescriptions for each year 
from a Taylor (1993) rule.
4 The Great Inflation in each country tends to correspond with large 
deviations from the Taylor rule prescription.  One caveat is that the reliability of the rule 
prescriptions depends on the quality of the data used as inputs.  Just as price controls in New 
Zealand artificially suppressed inflation over 1982−84, the use of the distorted inflation data in 
the Taylor rule produces a spurious dip in the interest-rate prescriptions. 
 
A related caveat about data quality is that the rule prescriptions in Figures 4−6 use detrended 
output computed from final data.  As Orphanides (2003) shows for the U.S., such revised 
estimates may differ substantially from policymakers’ perception in real time of the position of 
output relative to potential.  Figures 7 to 9 plot detrended output for the 1970s for each country,  
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
2 The New Zealand 1966−84 reaction function is estimated with annual observations, with the short-term interest rate 
being the annual average of the series used by Orden and Fisher (1993).  No output response is reported because 
detrended output entered with a negligible coefficient, and was dropped from the specification.  The low output 
response could reflect low quality of the data, or the fact that the detrended output series used in estimation has little 
resemblance to that used in real time by policymakers (see Figure 9 and the related discussion).   
3 The Canadian monetary policy reaction coefficients are obtained from the long-run solution of a forward-looking 
quarterly partial adjustment rule of the type estimated for the U.S. by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000).  In this 
estimated rule, the right-hand-side variables are the lagged interest rate, one-quarter-ahead annualized CPI inflation, 
and detrended log output.  The detrending of output assumes a linear trend with intercept and slope breaks in 1973 Q4 
and 1994 Q4.  Two lags of the interest rate, inflation, and detrended output are used as instruments. 
4 The prescriptions impose an inflation target of 2.5% and a steady-state real rate of 4% (3% for Canada).   4
Table 1. Estimated long-run responses in interest-rate policy rules 
 Canada  Australia
a New  Zealand 
   70  Q1− 
79 Q4 
  71 Q1− 
 78 Q4 
80 Q1− 
02 Q1 
   63 Q1− 



















2.39 3.03  0.40  0.76
a 1.13
a  ⎯  0.19
c 
a. Source: Kara and Nelson (2003).  b. Estimated on annual data; prior year’s inflation rate in rule.   
c. Source: Huang, Margaritis, and Mayes (2001).  (Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002) report similar  
    results for the longer sample 1988 Q2−2001 Q3.) 
 
Table 2. Average annual output growth rates
a 
Canada Australia  New  Zealand 
1962−1973 1974−1993 1961−1973 1974−1993 1961−1973 1974−1993 
5.3 2.7 4.8 2.8 4.9  1.0 
a.  For Canada and Australia, output is defined as real GDP; for New Zealand, output is defined as 
      nominal GDP divided by the CPI. 
 
Table 3. Correlations of CPI inflation and money growth k years earlier, 1969−1998 
Canada Australia  New  Zealand 
k = 0  k = 1  k = 2  k = 0  k = 1  k = 2  k = 0  k = 1  k = 2 




5 against estimates of the output gap during the 1970s.  For Australia and 
Canada, historical estimates of the output gap were reported by the OECD (1973).  Comparison 
of these 1973 estimates with today’s estimates of detrended output suggests that the initial 
numbers overstated the weakness of demand in the early 1970s.  In addition, like the U.S., the 
three countries studied here experienced slower growth in output after 1973 (Table 2).  The 
detrended output series plotted in Figures 7−9 take this break in trend into account, but gap 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
5 Final data on detrended output in Figures 7−9 are linear-detrended annual GDP data, also used in Figures 4−6.  The 
linear trends assume breaks in 1974 (as well as 1995 for Canada and Australia).  As Figure 7 shows, for Canada, the 
resulting series has the implausible property of being negative virtually throughout the 1970s.  An alternative 
(quadratic) detrending method instead yields a series that is positive throughout the 1970s.  This confirms the 
sensitivity of Canadian GDP to detrending methods, documented for the post-1982 period by Cayen and van Norden 
(2002).  The high inflation and money growth outcomes in Canada during the 1970s suggest that the actual output gap 
was generally positive rather than negative.   5
estimates up to 1977 did not.
6 As a result, the 1977 gap estimates reported in Figures 7−9 are far 
more negative in the late 1970s than the final estimates of output relative to trend.
7 
 
Some perspective on the response of inflation to monetary actions is given in Table 3.  Taking 
money growth as a crude summary of the monetary policy settings put in place by central-bank 
actions on interest rates,
8 the table suggests that developments in inflation are most closely 
related with monetary policy actions in earlier years.  As discussed below, the failure of 
monetary tightenings to produce immediate inflation responses contributed to the popularity of 
nonmonetary views of inflation in the 1970s. 
 
3.  The Monetary Policy Neglect Hypothesis 
 
Using the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the behavior of inflation may be written as follows: 
 
πt = b1 + b2 EtΣi=0
∞b3
i (yt+i – yt+i *) + b4(ut – E[ut]), (1) 
 
where πt is inflation, yt is log output, yt* is log potential output, ut is an exogenous disturbance, 
and the bi are positive coefficients with b3 near unity.
9 The alternative views of inflation in 1970s 
debates—monetary versus nonmonetary—may be expressed as restrictions on equation (1). 
 
A nonmonetary explanation of inflation attributes the movements of inflation during the 1970s to 
persistent movements in the ut term in equation (1)—often termed “cost-push” fluctuations—as 
well as to shifts in the mean of the ut process (which thus produced shifts in the constant term, 
b1).  This explanation contends that excess demand did not matter for inflation, as it maintains 
that the coefficient b2 goes to zero when the output gap (yt – yt*) is negative.  Therefore, under 
this explanation, output falling below potential does not produce any downward pressure on 
inflation.  Exponents of the nonmonetary explanation of inflation in the 1970s frequently 
conceded that a role for excess demand factors in driving inflation arises when output is above 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
6 Appendix 3 describes the construction of the real-time output gaps for 1977.  
7 It is true that detrended output and the actual output gap can differ, because of cyclical variation in potential GDP.  
But this discrepancy should have a zero mean, and therefore cannot account for the nonzero-mean errors in estimates of 
the output gap observed during the 1970s. 
8 Money growth is measured by percentage change in currency.  Following Friedman and Schwartz (1970), this choice 
reflects the fact that while more appropriate measures of money include noncurrency items (such as deposits or 
reserves), these items are more likely to suffer from distortions (e.g. changes in their own rate of return) that make their 
historical movements difficult to interpret.  The fragmentary data available on money including deposits do, however, 
support the evidence in Table 3.  For example, an annual series for New Zealand M3 growth obtained from Orden and 
Fisher’s (1993) dataset leads inflation by three years with a correlation of 0.74 for 1970−79, and by one year for 
1980−89 with a correlation of 0.52.  Annual data for Canadian M2 growth derived from Amano and Wirjanto’s (1996) 
dataset leads inflation over 1975−92 by one year with a correlation of 0.86.  
9 See Nelson (2004) for a derivation of equation (1) giving formulae for each coefficient.   6
potential,
10 but this was a minor qualification, as they believed that the output gap was rarely 
positive during the 1970s.  
 
A monetary explanation of inflation, on the other hand, contends that b2 is well above zero for all 
values of the output gap, and that the shifts in inflation during the 1970s are attributable to 
excessive aggregate demand (protracted periods of positive output gaps) created by the monetary 
authorities.  The explanation concedes a role for the ut term in equation (1) in producing one-
time movements in the price level, but gives it no role in causing changes in the mean of 
inflation or fluctuations in expected inflation.  Together with b2 > 0, the monetary explanation 
therefore imposes the restrictions that yt is interest-elastic (so excessive demand can be prevented 
by monetary policy), and that ut has a zero mean (implying that E[ut] does not enter the 
expression for b1) and is white noise (so only excess demand and the constant term enter the 
expression for expected future inflation).
11 
 
The monetary policy neglect hypothesis claims that the monetary explanation of inflation is the 
correct one, but that policymakers in the 1970s subscribed to the nonmonetary explanation.  
They therefore relied on wage and price controls, rather than monetary policy, to control 
inflation.  And because their theory led them to believe that there was no connection between 
(negative) output gaps and inflation, policymakers were inclined to maintain the optimistic views 
of potential GDP that they inherited from the 1960s, instead of revising output-gap estimates in 
light of high inflation outcomes.  Over-expansionary monetary policy in the 1970s therefore 
came about from two interacting factors: policymakers’ failure to appreciate the need for 
monetary restraint in controlling inflation; and their desire to enact stabilization policy by 
responding to negative output gaps.  The monetary policy neglect hypothesis is thus 
complementary with Orphanides’ (2003) claim that output-gap mismeasurement was a source of 
inflationary policy error in the 1970s. 
 
3.1 The Nonmonetary Explanation: Two Special Cases 
 
Two variants of the nonmonetary explanation of inflation that became particularly popular in 
1970s debates actually argued that monetary policy tightening made inflation worse.  These 
variants recurred so frequently that it is worthwhile to discuss each of them here. 
 
Unit-cost-push.  This variant of the cost-push argument starts from the observation that firms’ 
pricing decisions are based closely on their unit cost.  It then claims that restrictive monetary 
policy pushes prices up by reducing demand and therefore output (the denominator of the 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
10 That is, they subscribed to an asymmetric version of equation (1), where b2 turns positive only when the output gap is 
positive. 
11 The white-noise restriction additionally implies b4 = 1 in equation (1).   7
expression for unit cost).
12 The argument is predicated upon the view that demand restriction 
exerts negligible downward pressure on costs of production (the numerator of the expression for 
unit cost).  It is therefore an invalid argument from a monetary perspective on inflation.  The 
monetary view holds that costs are elastic with respect to aggregate demand, and so restrictive 
monetary policy tends to reduce unit costs.  
 
Interest-cost-push.  This version of the cost-push argument is based on the position that nominal 
interest payments are a component both of the CPI and firm production costs.  Since monetary 
restriction is initially manifested in higher nominal interest rates, it is, according to this 
argument, a source of upward rather than downward pressure on prices.  The argument confuses 
aggregate with relative price movements.  The partial effect of monetary restriction may be 
higher values for certain prices and costs.  But provided inflation is a monetary phenomenon—
implying b2 is positive in equation (1)—monetary restriction, by producing a smaller excess of 
output over potential than before, puts downward pressure on the aggregate inflation rate. 
 
3.2 Factors in Individual Countries 
 
The monetary-versus-nonmonetary contrast of inflation theories given above is the same as that 
used in Nelson (2004) for the U.S. and the U.K.  Two factors frequently invoked as justifying a 
different analysis of inflation in countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, are openness 
and labor market arrangements. Here, I discuss why I have not made any modifications to the 
analysis in light of these factors. 
 
Openness.  The above outline takes the monetary explanation of inflation as stating that, starting 
from low inflation, a monetary policy that keeps the path of the output gap at zero is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for CPI inflation to be kept low—both in the sense of a low mean 
inflation rate, and no persistent deviations from this mean.  It is sometimes argued that for highly 
open economies, this proposition must be qualified, either because import-price or world 
inflation appears as an additional variable (beside the output gap) in the Phillips curve, or 
because central-bank control of inflation depends on how reliably the exchange rate responds to 
monetary policy.  I do not accept either qualification in the analysis here.  Rather, I contend that 
open-economy factors matter only for inflation insofar as they affect the output gap, and that 
episodes of import-price inflation not associated with positive output gaps lead to movements in 
relative prices rather than the aggregate CPI.  This contention rests on the success of modeling 
approaches that treat imports as an intermediate good rather than a CPI component, and on the 
experience of the countries studied in this paper, where large exchange-rate depreciations have 
been compatible with stable CPI inflation (e.g., in the late 1990s). 
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
12 The unit-cost-push view was expressed early in the Great Inflation by an editorial in The Economist (TE, 10/25/69).   8
Labor markets.  One factor which underpinned the adherence to nonmonetary views of inflation 
in Australia and New Zealand was the institutional background prevailing up to the 1990s.  
Specifically, government tribunals (arbitration courts) had legally binding powers over wages in 
the private sector—powers covering both the minimum wage and various aspects of the relative 
wage structure.  This background has motivated the treatment of the mandated growth rate of 
wages as a separate explanatory variable besides the output gap in Phillips curves estimated on 
Australian data (e.g. Nevile, 1970, p. 81; Gruen, Pagan, and Thompson, 1999, p. 228). 
 
In opposition to this approach, it has been argued that the fact that wage growth in practice 
departs from the officially-mandated values, combined with the observation that wage-tribunal 
decisions are influenced by economic considerations, justifies treating actual wage growth as 
essentially market-determined (e.g. Jonson, 1973).  Another important consideration is that price 
inflation may be driven by excess demand even when current wage growth deviates from market 
forces.  One reason for this is that economic theory suggests that, when prices are sticky, they are 
driven by the entire expected future path of marginal cost (see Woodford, 2003, Ch. 2), which is 
much more plausibly treated as endogenous than as a tribunal-determined exogenous variable.
13 
Excess demand then exerts predictable effects on inflation via its effect on the expected path of 
costs.  In line with these arguments, the position taken in this paper is that wages policy impacts 
inflation only via affecting excess-demand conditions.  This position appears consistent with the 
analysis of Australian experience with incomes policies (see Section 5 below).   
 
Let us now consider the experience of each country during the Great Inflation in more detail, 
beginning with Canada. 
 
4.  Canada 
 
Canadian monetary policymakers ended the 1960s with a disinflationary strategy informed by 
several modern insights.  Not only did they subscribe to a conventional view of the inflationary 
process, they recognized and explicitly endorsed the hypothesis that the long-run Phillips curve 
was vertical.  Louis Rasminsky, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, did so in early 1969 when 
he described the inflation/unemployment trade-off as “an illusion” because “people… develop an 
expectation of continuing inflation and adjust their behavior accordingly” (TGM, 02/21/69).  In 
addition, Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister and head of the Liberal Party Government, himself 
stated in 1970 that it had “been shown that this trade-off is a short-run phenomenon, and that 
sacrificing price stability will not by itself aid in improving a country’s long-run employment 
situation” (CPD, 10/09/70, p. 33).  The latter statement was especially notable as it came from 
the executive branch of government which, in Canada as well as the two other countries studied 
in this paper, had effective control over monetary policy throughout the 1970s. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
13 This theory also implies that non-wage costs and measured profit margins will be responsive to excess demand, 
which seems in line with the Australian experience (e.g. Grenville, 1995).   9
By 1975, however, the Canadian authorities had moved from this conventional position to an 
adherence to a nonmonetary view of inflation, and imposed compulsory wage and price controls.  
The transition to this state of affairs is due to two factors.  First, a strong body of opinion in 
Canada advocating cost-push positions existed from the beginning of the 1970s.  Second, errors 
in official estimates of the output gap led to estimated gap/inflation combinations that were a 
challenge for the conventional theory of inflation to explain.  Both these factors grew in 
importance over the period of conventional policy, 1969−71. 
 
4.1 1969−71: Orthodox Beginnings 
 
Over 1969 and 1970, the Canadian authorities gave primacy to aggregate demand restraint in 
reducing inflation.  Prime Minister Trudeau indicated that “our policies to slow down the 
economy… will be slackened when the inflationary psychology is broken in this country” (CPD, 
04/17/70, p. 5984).  Moreover, policymakers indicated that they would not be perturbed if the 
period of monetary restriction led to an interim period of simultaneous rising unemployment and 
continuing high inflation.  Governor Rasminsky said that it would “not be too surprising, given 
the lags involved, if there is a temporary, rather discouraging period when we seem to be getting 
the worst of both worlds” (FP, 11/01/69).  
 
Several outside commentators resorted instead to cost-push explanations of Canada’s 
macroeconomic behavior.  An editorial in the Financial Post newspaper, for example, blamed 
the “1968 double-whammy” of higher rates of inflation and unemployment on tax increases and 
wage-push (FP, 04/26/69).  The most persistent exponent of cost-push analysis and 
prescriptions, however, was the Toronto Star newspaper, both on its editorial page and through 
its economics columnist, Dian Cohen.  Cohen’s view was that it was “very hard to maintain that 
our current inflation is the result of excessive demand,” and that the lesson from the U.S. 
experience for Canada was that monetary tightening “invariably resulted in massive 
unemployment without the desired price stabilization” (TST, 02/02/70).  Restrictive monetary 
policy worsened inflation in her analysis via the unit-cost-push effect; fiscal tightening could 
also be counterproductive because “as taxes go up so, ultimately, do prices” (TST, 12/14/70).
14 
Cohen combined these positions with interest-push and wage-push views to conclude that “the 
chief sources of inflation are rising taxes, rising interest-rate costs, rising wages and salaries—
and even rising unemployment” (TST, 03/01/71), and that “economic policies that have 
traditionally been thought to curb inflation actually aggravate and encourage it” (TST, 03/27/72).  
As alternative policies, she advocated expansion of the money supply alongside “lower tax 
rates… to reduce the cost inflation” (TST, 11/16/70).  The Toronto Star editorials concurred that 
Canada’s problem was “‘cost-push’ inflation [which] occurs when corporations and organized 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
14 Similarly, Don McGillivray in the Financial Times of Canada wrote that the “[e]vidence that taxes are a cause of 
inflation” was “piling up” (FTC, 12/04/72); while Lubor Zink in the Toronto Sun asserted that “every increase in tax 
rates is soon reflected in higher production costs and consumer prices” (TSN, 03/08/74).   10
labor take out more than they’re putting in” (TST, 08/21/71), and advocated a wage-prize freeze 
followed by a system of direct controls—which it called “the only weapon left against inflation” 
(TST, 02/10/72). 
 
The Government was initially in a good position to resist these criticisms, as its disinflationary 
policy succeeded in bringing inflation below 3% by the end of 1970 without resort to controls.  
However, as Figure 7 shows, the Government overestimated the amount of slack it had created in 
producing this favorable inflation result.  Consequently, it switched to a considerably easier 
policy during 1970.  Even in late 1971, the OECD judged that “an expansionary economic policy 
still appears appropriate, given the existing amount of slack in the Canadian economy” (WFP, 
12/28/71), while the Bank of Canada’s 1972 report claimed that “there is undoubtedly too much 
slack in the economy” (quoted in Courchene, 1976, p. 182).  In fact, however, the Government 
had already injected so much stimulus that inflation was on the way back up. 
 
4.2 1972−74: Blaming International Factors 
 
While the Canadian authorities had begun the decade pursuing disinflation with success, the 
resurgence of inflation from 1972 converted them to cost-push analysis and nonmonetary 
remedies.  They would deny, in line with the output-gap estimates available at the time, that 
Canada had an excess-demand problem.  Instead, they would blame international factors—what 
Prime Minister Trudeau called “worldwide economic pressures largely beyond our control” 
(TSN, 03/06/74)—for provoking inflation in Canada.  According to this argument, the revival of 
inflation in Canada arose from its pressure on the prices of world commodities, due to excess 
demand outside Canada.  Import-price inflation and cost-of-living adjustments of wages had then 
driven up CPI inflation within Canada.  The policy response over 1972−74 consisted of actions 
to affect specific prices, as well as tax cuts.  Monetary policy, on the other hand, was eased to 
fight the perceived unemployment problem. 
 
Finance Minister Turner foreshadowed the Government’s reliance on commodity-price-push as 
the explanation for Canada’s inflation when in early 1972 he noted that the country’s inflation 
performance had recently deteriorated, but “this is partly attributable to special factors relating to 
food” (CPD, 02/24/72, p. 215).  Reviewing still worse inflation a year later, he said “in large 
measure it reflected the worldwide market forces pushing up the prices of grains, meat, sugar and 
other basic foods” (CPD, 02/19/73, p. 1431).  After a further year, he contended that “the sharp 
increase in oil prices plus the rise in commodity and food prices constitutes the primary thrust of 
inflation in this country” (CPD, 01/07/74, p. 9100). 
 
In September 1973, Turner listed the specific measures the Government had taken against 
inflation: sales tax cuts, tariff reductions, and controls on the export of agricultural products 
(CPD, 09/13/73, p. 6513).  Similar measures were announced in his May 1974 Budget speech,   11
where a section entitled “The Program against Inflation” was followed by two subsections, 
“Measures to Increase Supply,” and “Measures to Hold Down Particular Prices” (CPD, 
05/06/74, p. 2082).  Both sets of measures were intended to offset the effects of world inflation 
on the CPI, the first by reducing the extent of the commodity price increase in Canada—a 
strategy Turner characterized as aiming for “an increase in supply so as to get to the root of 
inflation” (CPD, 09/13/73, p. 6512)—and the second by acting on the prices of other CPI 
components.  
 
The Government’s acknowledgement of a contribution of developments within Canada to 
inflation was limited.  Turner saw the problem as “a complicated interaction between world 
demand-pull inflationary forces and the reaction in Canada of cost-push forces,” such as wage-
earners demanding compensation for price increases (CPD, 01/07/74, p. 9100).  The authorities 
saw income tax cuts as the means of arresting wage spirals of this type, by increasing disposable 
income without the need for nominal wage increases (CPD, 02/19/73, p. 1435).  Prime Minister 
Trudeau also indicated that the Government would increase antitrust regulation to deal with “the 
cause of certain types of cost-push inflation… [W]e’re dealing first with the monopoly of 
business because that is the more dangerous one” (TST, 09/20/73).  
 
To accompany these nonmonetary measures, Turner judged that a “generally expansionary 
monetary policy” was appropriate, so as to reduce unemployment.  He expressed satisfaction that 
excessive money growth could be dealt with by direct controls—i.e., by an agreement among the 
commercial banks on loan expansion, and a lowering of the legal limit on rates on large 
deposits—rather than conventional monetary tools such as open market operations (CPD, 
02/19/73, p. 1430).  Turner reaffirmed in April 1973 that “monetary policy… [will] continue to 
be expansionary” (CPD, 04/10/73, p. 3132).  In 1974, he rejected “deflation of demand by severe 
measures of fiscal and monetary restraint” as a solution to inflation (CPD, 05/06/74, p. 2078), 
and instead described his strategy as “breaking the inflationary spiral without impeding the 
continued strong growth of production, employment and income” (TGM, 06/08/74).  In effect 
endorsing the unit-cost-push argument, he claimed that restrictive demand policies abroad were 
worsening inflation because they resulted in lower production (CPD, 10/09/74, p. 260). 
 
The evidence from interest-rate rules in Figure 4 and Table 1 suggest that, contrary to official 
beliefs at the time, loose Canadian monetary policy was responsible for the return of Canada’s 
inflation.  As discussed above, the easing had started with the expansionary measures of 1970.  
Neither excess demand abroad nor the rise in commodity prices actually provides grounds for 
believing that Canada could have sustained inflation without monetary stimulus.  Canada’s 
exchange rate had floated in 1970, providing the conditions under which international shocks 
should impact relative prices, but not the ongoing inflation rate, within Canada. Those conditions 
were not taken advantage of by the authorities.  Instead, their cost-push interpretation of inflation 
encouraged them to continue monetary expansion.   12
The Conservative Party Opposition shared with the Government a cost-push view of inflation.  
Its critique of the Government was therefore based on the source of the cost-push, which it 
argued was two-thirds domestic (TSN, 03/06/74).  From May 1973 the Conservatives proposed a 
three-month wage-price freeze, followed by permanent controls, to fight inflation (TST, 
05/11/73).  Consistent with their cost-push perspective, they did not see controls as a means of 
speeding up the effects of traditional demand management, but instead as a new instrument that 
could compensate for the ineffectiveness of demand policies.  In their 1974 policy document on 
inflation, for example, the Conservatives characterized controls as a tool required because 
“monetary and fiscal policies alone cannot do the job” (quoted in Saywell, 1975, p. 34).  As far 
as traditional policy weapons were concerned, the Opposition laid emphasis on cuts in 
government spending and taxes, whose hoped-for anti-inflationary effect would take place 
largely through a cost-push channel.
15 Opposition Leader Stanfield specifically repudiated what 
he called “the same discredited methods of high interest rates that were used in 1969 and 1970” 
(CPD, 09/13/73, p. 6511).  
 
The Government’s rejection of controls as a solution did not rest on an acceptance of a monetary 
view of inflation, but instead on its favored cost-push explanation.  Since it believed that the 
origin of Canada’s inflation was in foreign price behavior, rather than principally domestic wage-
push, it rejected the value of domestic wage and price controls.  In September 1973, Turner 
speculated that “if it became evident that the fundamental nature of the problem had changed, 
that the main source of inflationary pressure… [was] a domestic spiral of costs and prices, [the] 
policy response of the Government might well be different” (CPD, 09/13/73, p. 6512). 
 
4.3 1974−75: Capitulation to Controls 
 
In late 1974 the Government began to nominate wage-push as the source of inflation.  In his 
November Budget speech, Turner claimed that “the response to earlier international price 
increases has provoked domestic forces of cost-push inflation in Canada” (CPD, 11/18/74, p. 
1421).  He continued this diagnosis in a January 1975 speech, stating: “The nature of the 
inflationary problem is changing in a fundamental way.  Initially the forces of inflation were set 
in motion internationally… Now the driving force is coming from the rapid escalation of wage 
and salary costs as those who work… keep pace with the rising cost of living” (quoted in 
Saywell, 1975, p. 366).  Mechanically, the Government’s changed diagnosis arose from the fact 
that commodity price growth had receded, while double-digit CPI inflation continued.  
Inflation—according to the cost-push view—thus became “domestic” in character.  A more 
standard analysis, however, would dispute that inflation’s character had changed—rather, 
excessive demand conditions remained the problem throughout.  These conditions account for 
why high inflation continued even after commodity price pressures eased. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
15 A sympathetic commentator on the Conservatives’ program described them as “a concerted attack on the roots of 
inflation (i.e., government overspending and union-business cost-price fixing)” (TSN, 05/09/74).   13
The Government’s response to the perceived domestic cost-push was to introduce further income 
tax cuts as well as to begin talks on a voluntary incomes policy (CPD, 11/18/74, p. 1423).  
Following the collapse of these talks in May 1975, Prime Minister Trudeau said that the change 
in character of inflation from international to wage-push meant that the case against compulsory 
wage and price controls had weakened (TST, 05/23/75).  On October 13, 1975, Trudeau 
announced a three-year control program. 
 
4.4 1975−78: Monetary Policy in the Controls Period 
 
In conjunction with the imposition of the controls, Finance Minister Macdonald announced that 
the Bank of Canada would pursue targets for M1 growth, on the grounds that it was “essential for 
the success of any prices and incomes policy to avoid too rapid a rate of growth of demand and 
the development of excess pressure on resources” (TGM, 10/15/75).  The stage therefore seemed 
set for a restrictive monetary policy to accompany price controls, thus providing a 
counterexample to the generalization that periods of control are accompanied by monetary ease.   
 
In practice, however, such a counterexample did not emerge: while policy did tighten over 1976, 
nominal interest rates fell and currency growth picked up during 1977.  The M1 growth targets 
continued to be met over the latter period, but hitting these targets did not, in the event, prove an 
obstacle to a substantial monetary easing—recorded in falling real and nominal interest rates, and 
rising growth rates of non-M1 definitions of money—because households reduced their holdings 
of M1 deposits relative to other classes of deposits.  Consistent with the easing, output moved 
upward relative to trend during 1978, and inflation revived over 1978−81.  
 
The Bank of Canada characterized this period as one of unintended ease, arising from the shift in 
M1 demand (see Courchene, 1981).  Other evidence, however, suggests that much of the easing 
was conscious, and reflected the lingering influence of cost-push views—i.e., that Canada’s 
inflation was of a nonmonetary character, and that therefore the case for restraining aggregate 
demand was not compelling.  In a speech in June 1976, Finance Minister Macdonald reaffirmed 
the Government’s nonmonetary diagnosis of inflation, stating: “It is frequently argued that… 
excessive increases in the money supply have been the major cause of inflation in Canada… But 
I do not believe they are the primary cause of the inflation we have experienced in this country” 
(quoted in TGM, 08/19/76). 
 
Correspondingly, as they watched inflation fall during the controls period, policymakers appear 
to have had too much confidence that the decline represented the genuine removal of inflationary 
pressure.  Just eight months into the controls, Bank of Canada Governor Bouey stated that it was 
“within the realm of possibility that receding inflation will permit a gradual moderation of 
money supply growth without the need for significantly higher interest rates than we have at 
present,” and that “in an atmosphere of growing confidence that inflation was being brought   14
under control… interest rates could over time be expected to begin declining” (TGM, 06/24/76).  
This message would have been unexceptional during a period of no price controls.  But in a 
period where an observed decline in inflation was virtually inevitable because of the controls, the 
message would have helped encourage expectations of interest-rate cuts to accompany the 
decline.  By early 1977, the Bank of Canada had indeed cut short-term nominal interest rates 
down to levels lower than those prevailing at the start of price controls.  Ex-post real rates—
which overstate the actual level of real rates because of the controls’ suppressing effect on 
inflation—were also below their pre-control levels.  The experience of Canada under wage and 
price controls thus conforms to Grossman’s (1982, p. 138) generalization that episodes of 
controls “have prompted the monetary authorities to become less concerned about inflation and, 
thereby, have helped to produce the subsequent increase in inflation.” 
 
The switch to excessive ease was, as in 1970, also prompted by an excessive pessimism about 
the output gap.  Governor Bouey acknowledged publicly in 1975 that the authorities had in the 
early 1970s been slow to recognize increases in the natural unemployment rate, and so had 
overestimated the degree of slack (Courchene, 1976, p. 229).  By the time this structural change 
had been recognized, however, the severe post-1973 slowdown in potential growth had become a 
new source of output-gap mismeasurement.  Contemporary observers of the Canadian economy 
initially mistook much of this slowdown as reflecting weakness in demand—a misconception 
paralleling the U.S. situation, studied by Orphanides (2003).  As Figure 7 shows, the OECD’s 
1977 estimates of Canada’s output gap were far more negative than now seem appropriate.
16 
Subscribers to a monetary view of inflation such as Laidler (1978) questioned these gap 
estimates, on the grounds that they were inconsistent with Canada’s severe inflation.  Cost-push 
adherents, on the other hand, felt that severely negative output gaps and high inflation were 
compatible. 
 
While cost-push views do appear to have discouraged the authorities from implementing a 
sufficiently tight monetary policy over 1975−78, such views did lead to a genuine disinflation 
beginning in 1978.  Just as in the U.S. in the same year (see Nelson, 2004, Section 5), a fear 
based on a cost-push scenario—a wage-price spiral triggered by exchange-rate depreciation—
triggered a monetary tightening.  The Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada explained that the 
Bank in 1978 was “raising domestic interest rates repeatedly” out of concern that “the direct 
impact on Canada’s price level of further substantial exchange [rate] depreciation could… set off 
a renewed outbreak of serious wage inflation” (Freeman, 1981, p. 200).  The belief that exchange 
rate depreciation was a source of Canada’s inflation was shared by the executive branch of 
government.  Trudeau claimed in October 1978 that “inflation is coming in from outside, very 
simply because of the high cost of things we import, and very simply because of the lowered 
value of the [Canadian] dollar” (CPD, 10/12/78, p. 33).  Finance Minister Chrétien blamed the 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
16 As late as March 1977, a Canadian financial columnist described 5% as “Canada’s long-term average rate of real 
growth,” and characterized the Bank of Canada’s monetary targets as guided by that rate (FTC, 03/14/77).   15
revival on inflation on “the rise in food prices and the fall in the dollar,” and endorsed the fear 
that these would trigger “a fresh outbreak of large, leap-frogging wage and price increases” 
(CPD, 11/16/78, p. 1200).   
 
According to an orthodox (monetary) view of inflation, this import-price-push view was 
invalid—depreciation could not spark a new inflation spiral, unless it was itself a symptom of 
excessive demand created by the government.  Despite its misguided character, however, the 
import-price-push view was important, both in Canada and the U.S., in shifting monetary 
policymakers to a tighter position from late 1978.  The shift is consistent with the evidence 
(Table 1) that Canadian monetary policy had taken on a less accommodative stance by the start 
of 1979.  The tighter policy eventually produced dividends in lower inflation: four-quarter CPI 
inflation peaked in Canada in mid-1981, and had fallen below 5% by the end of 1983.  
 
5.  Australia 
 
Australia never had compulsory price controls of the type imposed in Canada, but in other 
respects was more immersed in a nonmonetary tradition of inflation control that lingered until 
the 1990s. 
 
5.1 1971−72: Blaming Wage-Push 
 
In the fourth quarter of 1970, annualized CPI inflation was 7.7% and the four-quarter rate 
reached 4.9%; both were the highest rates in Australia since the mid-1950s.  The inflation 
breakout occurred during the term of office of the Government headed by Liberal Party leader 
John Gorton.
17 In response, Prime Minister Gorton gave a televised address to the nation on 
January 29, 1971, which blamed inflation on wage-push.  Gorton ruled out “taking monetary and 
fiscal measures at this time,” stating that his Government did not “believe the present situation 
requires a lift in interest rates, already high” (SMH, 01/30/71).  Aggregate demand measures 
were limited to proposed reductions in government spending; Gorton ruled out another fiscal 
option, increases in indirect taxes, on cost-push grounds.  A business leader, H.N. Herford of the 
Associated Chamber of Manufacturers, endorsed this strategy; like the Government, he blamed 
“cost-push inflationary factors” and rejected any strategy to “dampen down demand where no 
dampening, on current indications, is needed” (SMH, 02/11/71). 
 
A parliamentary debate on inflation three weeks later was notable for the rejection, by both sides, 
of monetary actions to fight inflation.  Prime Minister Gorton reaffirmed that “the real 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
17 In Australia, in contrast to Canada, the principal conservative party is known as the Liberal Party, with the Australian 
Labor Party its main electoral opponent.  In the period studied here, the Liberal Party headed a government until 
December 1972, and was followed by Labor for two terms (1972−75).  The Liberals then headed a government for 
three terms from 1975 to 1983, after which Labor served four terms over 1983−96.   16
problem… is cost-push inflation,” and maintained that the “biggest single influence now which 
can prevent inflation is a conscious and firm effort on the part of wage-fixing tribunals” (APD, 
02/18/71, p. 314).  The Cabinet minister with responsibility for labor market issues, B.M. 
Snedden, acknowledged that “we must avoid excess demand by maintaining general fiscal and 
monetary discipline” (APD, 02/18/71, p. 308), but maintained, “[w]e have full employment in 
Australia… [T]here is an excess demand threat, but excess demand does not presently exist… 
Deflationary fiscal policies… are counter-productive.  They would raise prices which would 
further stimulate wage demands… [and] also would slow the growth of demand… which would 
be likely to stop productivity growth” (APD, 02/18/71, pp. 306−307).
18 Rather, Snedden too 
maintained that the “answer to the present problems is that there should be more restraints on 
wages” (APD, 02/18/71, p. 308). 
 
The Government’s position, as revealed in these statements, was an amalgam of various cost-
push positions, including the claim that while excess demand creates inflationary pressure, 
negative output gaps do not remove it; and that inflation reflects autonomous influences.  The 
argument that policy tightenings are inflationary was also endorsed, on the grounds that they 
depress productivity and that higher taxes raise costs and prices.  Like other theories that claimed 
tightening was inflationary, these views were without merit.  Provided aggregate CPI inflation 
responds to real aggregate demand relative to potential, a tightening that reduces excess demand 
will be anti-inflationary in its overall effect, even if there are positive effects of policy 
tightenings on particular items in the CPI; and contractions of demand are often associated with 
declines in measured productivity growth in the short run.  
 
The Opposition party in Parliament (the Labor Party) was more inclined than the Government to 
view the economy as suffering from excessive demand; nevertheless, it too did not see the 
solution in central bank actions.  Opposition Leader Whitlam, in explaining why “the 
Government and its policies have been the principal cause of the current inflation” (APD, 
02/18/71, p. 275), blamed fiscal loosening (in particular, income tax cuts) as well as increases in 
indirect taxes and the prices of government services; and interest-rate increases, which had “been 
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices” (APD, 02/18/71, p. 279).  The 
acknowledgement of a monetary contribution to inflation in the Opposition’s analysis was 
limited to blaming the Government for permitting growth in unregulated financial intermediaries, 
for which the Opposition’s proposed solution was to expand regulation to include limits on the 
interest rates offered by nonbanks (APD, 02/18/71, pp. 277, 299).  The debate on inflation thus 
left both sides of politics rejecting conventional monetary tightening—i.e., open market 
operations that produced increases in interest rates—as a solution to inflation. 
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
18 Snedden had also put on record his support for the pre-Phillips curve view—an important part of the cost-push 
position—that demand did not exert upward pressure on prices until full employment was reached (Department of 
Labour and National Service, 1970, p. 17).   17
For some months in 1971, the Government (by now led by William McMahon) did pursue 
measures to rein in demand.  This did not represent an abandonment of its wage-push diagnosis, 
but instead reflected a fear that wage increases could lead to demand pressure.  In his August 
1971 Budget speech, Snedden, now Treasurer (the Cabinet member responsible for monetary and 
fiscal policy), described the strategy: “It would be calamitous for a general demand-type 
inflationary pressure to be superimposed upon and exacerbate present cost pressures… [I]f 
resistance to such cost increases is to be stiffened, as it must be, there has to be a sufficient 
degree of restraint on potential demand for resources” (APD, 08/17/71, pp. 39, 46).  Most of the 
1971 tightening took the form of fiscal, rather than monetary, actions.  Partly this reflected the 
fact that Australian governments in the 1970s erroneously thought that there was a near-
automatic relationship between budget deficits and money growth (e.g. APD, 08/17/71, p. 47).  
 
The pattern of inflation and unemployment outcomes that took place over the rest of 1971 led to 
the first talk of “stagflation” in Australia.  Opposition Leader Whitlam claimed: “With the 
unemployment figures issued on Monday we have a clear picture of ‘stagflation’—growing 
unemployment with inflation” (DM, 10/22/71).  Bob Hawke, then a labor-union leader and later 
Prime Minister for most of the 1980s, contended: “The McMahon Government must be the only 
government in Australia’s history with the doubtful achievement of having created a rapid 
increase in unemployment and uncontrolled inflation both at the same time” (DM, 10/22/71). 
 
The failure of inflation to fall in this period led to some misinterpretations.  First, the episode 
was cited as an example of monetary policy’s ineffectiveness under fixed exchange rates (e.g. 
AFR, 10/29/75).  But the ineffectiveness proposition did not apply here, as it is inconsistent with 
the slowing of aggregate demand growth that did occur.  In fact, the existence of foreign 
exchange controls, the success of sterilization in the short run, and (after 1972) the willingness of 
the authorities to alter their exchange rate targets, meant that fixed exchange rates, though 
formally adhered to until the end of 1983, did not prevent substantial monetary policy 
independence.  Consistent with this, the Australian monetary authorities employed an interest-
rate instrument, varying nominal rates relative to world rates on many occasions.  Capital inflow 
did become the overwhelming influence on money base growth in 1972−73, but this reflected 
what was in essence a conscious domestic policy decision, as the Government at the end of 1971 
voluntarily joined the U.S. in devaluation. 
 
Second, and more importantly, the Government saw the failure of inflation to respond to 
tightening as validating its earlier diagnosis of autonomous wage-push.  Treasurer Snedden 
continued to attribute inflation to “excessive wage increases” (SUN, 10/22/71), while Prime 
Minister McMahon denied responsibility: “It is obvious that the rise in the consumer price index 
is due mainly to cost increases brought about by very large wage increases.  It is plainly absurd 
for the Leader of the Opposition to attribute the rise to the Government” (DM, 10/22/71).   
   18
The continuation of inflation also reaffirmed the doubts by the Government and outside 
commentators that restrictive aggregate demand policies could help bring inflation down.  For 
example, business columnist Warren Beeby judged that “the critical level of demand inflation 
which Mr. Snedden sought to stem through budgetary measures hardly existed at the time… 
Demand is slackening, factories are operating at much less than full capacity…”  He also 
endorsed the popular interest-cost-push view: “In the present economic climate, a reduction in 
interest rates is more likely to act against inflation than feed it.  It would relax some of the cost 
pressures, stimulate demand, and get industry moving again…” (SA, 09/19/71).  Similarly, 
financial columnist Kenneth Davidson judged that “the August Budget… is not proving very 
successful in curbing cost-push inflation.  All the Budget has done is to demonstrate beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that excess demand pressures are not the root cause of inflation at present”  
(TA, 11/06/71).  A commercial bank, ANZ Banking Group, criticized the Government for not 
adopting the policy mix of demand expansion and wage/price controls being pursued in the U.S.: 
“It is anomalous that Australia’s policy… should be so different… Greater spending would 
stimulate an expansion of production [and] reduce unit costs…” (TA, 11/20/71).  
 
In November 1971, Treasurer Snedden stated that “a good proportion of decisions on prices are 
already taken to some extent independently of market criteria” (SMH, 11/19/71).  Corporations’ 
monopoly power was thus added to wage-push on the list of causes of inflation.  For policy, 
Snedden presented of the choice as between compulsory and voluntary incomes policies, thereby 
effectively endorsing the argument that demand management was not a successful weapon. 
 
The resort to cost-push explanations of inflation by policymakers and commentators in 1971−72 
reflects several interrelated flaws in their interpretation, all of which were repeated during the 
more severe stagflation of 1974.  They neglected the role of monetary easing (revealed for 
instance in a pickup in money growth in 1969−70) in creating the conditions for rapid nominal 
wage growth. Their analysis was also marred by the exaggerated picture the initial data gave of 
the restriction of demand.  For example, financial columnist Davidson regarded the 4% real 
growth rate recorded during 1971 as “hardly healthy,” because it was below Australia’s “long-
term potential real growth rate of 5 per cent a year” (TA, 11/24/71).  But data revisions now 
indicate that while GDP growth did slow down modestly during 1971, the economy was so 
strong in 1970 that output remained above its trend throughout 1971.  And when the 1971 
slowdown occurred, observers failed to account for the delayed response of inflation—which 
duly occurred in 1972—and so treated the absence of an immediate inflation decline as a policy 
failure.  All these flaws meant that actual inflation outcomes were erroneously interpreted as 
repudiating an excess-demand-based explanation of inflation. 
 
The cost-push view of inflation continued to be central to policymaking in 1972.  In that year, an 
internal Treasury analysis rejected the hypothesis that Australia’s inflation was due to excessive 
demand (resulting from capital inflow), in favor of a wage-push explanation (AFR, 06/13/73;   19
AFR, 10/29/75).  In one respect, the analysis was valid—the rapid money growth of 1972 
appears to have been mostly reflected in inflation after 1972; equally, however, the inflation of 
1972 appears consistent with prior monetary developments, so the Treasury’s emphasis on 
exogenous wage pressure was inappropriate.  The Government nevertheless accepted this 
analysis, and late in its term was still being described as “leaning heavily on the argument that 
wage increases cause inflation” (TA, 08/03/72).  Prime Minister McMahon depicted the 
economy’s prospects as moving to full employment output over 1972−73 alongside receding 
inflation (DT, 10/10/72).  Such a scenario relied on Australia’s inflation being purely of a cost-
push character—so that inflation could be removed by nonmonetary measures, with a shift of 
output toward potential exerting no inflationary pressure.  
  
5.2 1972−73: Monetary Tightening and Push for Controls 
  
Despite its rejection of a monetary explanation of 1972’s inflation, the Treasury was aware that 
the undervalued dollar and accompanying rapid money growth meant the prospect of excessive 
demand in 1973.  In light of these concerns, the Labor Government of Gough Whitlam, elected 
in December 1972, appreciated the Australian dollar and introduced foreign exchange controls, 
both of which worked in the direction of reducing money growth.  To this extent, the 
Government was now taking conventional monetary measures against inflation.  A submission to 
Cabinet by the Assistant Treasurer in October 1973 reveals, however, that the view of inflation 
held by the authorities remained unorthodox in important respects (ACR, 10/05/73).  This 
document classified inflation, which was now moving into double digits, as falling into three 
categories: imported inflation, which it characterized as working not only through the effect of 
balance of payments surpluses on the money supply but also “through rising import prices;” cost 
inflation; and demand inflation occurring when “demand… run[s] beyond the capacity of 
supply” (paras. 16 to 31).  This classification scheme amounted to a cost-push approach to 
inflation, supplemented by an acknowledgement that the output gap matters for inflation when 
the gap is positive.  By contrast, a monetary view of inflation would not categorize cost and 
imported inflation as distinct from demand inflation, but as simply routes through which 
excessive demand is transmitted to the inflation rate. 
 
For each type of inflation, the submission advanced different appropriate remedies.  National 
wage-tribunal decisions were cited as the primary source of cost inflation, suggesting an incomes 
policy response; the Government’s tariff cuts (discussed below) and revaluations were seen as 
having removed imported inflation; and aggregate demand restraint was invoked as the 
appropriate response to excessive demand.  The submission did acknowledge that demand 
pressure was one factor behind cost inflation, and made the important point that price and wage 
controls were not an answer to inflation provided the output gap remained positive.  But by 
attributing inflation when the output gap was negative to nonmonetary causes, the submission 
raised the prospect that demand restraint would be abandoned once it was believed that the   20
positive gap had been eliminated, even if inflation continued.  Developments in 1974 would see 
this prospect realized. 
 
The Government’s classification of inflation into three distinct types is also reflected in the three 
main actions it took under the heading of anti-inflationary policy in the second half of 1973: the 
tariff cuts of July 1973; the monetary tightening of September 1973; and the wage and price 
control referendum proposals of December 1973. 
 
The Government announced a 25 per cent tariff cut in July 1973 with the statement: “The 
justification for the general reduction of tariffs is the excessive rate of inflation which now 
prevails… The tariff changes will have a direct impact on import prices of about the same 
magnitude as an Australian revaluation of slightly less than 6 per cent” (TA, 07/19/73).  
Revaluation and tariff cuts are equivalent, however, only to adherents of a cost-push explanation 
of inflation.  The equivalence rests on the observation that both actions withdraw import-price-
push pressure on prices.  But from a monetary view of inflation, the two are not equivalent.  
Revaluation drains aggregate demand and reduces pressure on prices by creating a balance-of-
payments deterioration and thereby producing monetary contraction.  A tariff cut, by contrast, 
need have no such effects.  Prime Minister Whitlam would adhere to the import-price-push view 
of inflation well after he left office, maintaining in a 1977 television interview that “the biggest 
component of inflation at the moment in Australia is Australia’s excessive protectionism” (MC, 
09/19/77). 
 
Action was taken to reduce money growth with a 5% revaluation in September 1973, 
accompanied by an announcement by the Prime Minister of “a sharp rise [about 2%]... in interest 
yields” to be enforced by vigorous open market sales (SMH, 09/10/73).
19 In his announcement, 
Whitlam said that the interest-rate increase was “not something to be undertaken lightly.  But 
curbing the increase in liquidity and the money supply is an essential precondition if inflation is 
to be countered at all” (SMH, 09/10/73).  The reference to monetary restraint as a “precondition” 
for inflation control again left open the possibility that some inflation was of a nonmonetary 
variety.  But in acknowledging a role for monetary measures against inflation, the Government 
was taking a more orthodox view than several outside commentators, who either viewed inflation 
as entirely cost-push, or took fiscal policy to be the more reliable aggregate demand weapon.  To 
this end, the Opposition Treasury spokesman said: “We specifically reject the present undue 
reliance on monetary measures because it is ineffectual” (APD, 11/13/73, p. 3190), mentioning 
the prospect of “interest rates adding significantly to the general cost structure, inducing further 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
19 The Government’s use of open market operations to enact monetary tightening is important, as it represented a step 
away from the policy it foreshadowed in Opposition of relying on quantitative controls on financial institutions.  It thus 
implicitly accepted the position of the Reserve Bank and Treasury (recorded in e.g. AFR, 04/10/73, and ACR, 10/12/73) 
that quantitative controls were ineffective because they encouraged growth of deposit substitutes that were not subject 
to the controls.  Later in the 1970s, the Fraser Government would take the retrograde step of returning to reliance on 
quantitative controls.    21
waves of cost-push inflation” (p. 3191).  The Sydney Morning Herald took a similar view, 
arguing that “it would be highly undesirable to try and place the greater part of the burden of 
inflationary control on monetary policy” (SMH, 04/11/73).  In its second term (1974−75), the 
Government itself would adopt these views about monetary policy.   
 
The third measure against inflation by the Government during 1973 was an effort to introduce 
compulsory wage and price controls.  As the Canadian record suggests, a strong motivation for 
wage-price controls typically is the belief that inflation is a wage-push phenomenon.  That was 
indeed the view of former Treasurer Snedden, now Opposition Leader, who claimed: “They [the 
Government] have added greatly to inflation by their actions of encouraging wage increases to 
add labor cost pressure on prices” (TA, 04/18/73).  But the Whitlam Government at this stage 
played down wage-push as a source of inflation, in favor of an explanation stressing foreign 
pressure on both aggregate demand and costs.  As far as domestic sources of inflation were 
concerned, the Government nominated firms’ pricing decisions, and foreshadowed that price 
control would be an important part of its strategy, with Treasurer Crean claiming: “If we do 
nothing about prices, it is inevitable that wages will try to keep pace with prices” (DT, 04/14/73). 
 
Consequently, with different emphasis, both the Government and Opposition parties were by late 
1973 advocating compulsory wage and price controls.  Opposition Leader Snedden outlined a 
plan for a wage-price freeze, and rejected the view that “a freeze would only suppress inflation” 
because “[t]his objection confuses demand-pull inflation and cost inflation… [P]rices are rising 
not because of excess demand but because [of]… excessive wage settlements” (APD, 08/28/73, 
p. 463).  As it lacked the constitutional powers to impose wage and price controls, the 
Government held a referendum in December 1973 to obtain those powers.  The Opposition urged 
rejection of the referendum proposals not because of any objection to a compulsory incomes 
policy, but because it believed such a policy should be carried out through a joint agreement 
between the federal and state governments (which had the authority to introduce price controls) 
(AGE, 12/06/73).  The referendum proposals were defeated on December 8, 1973.   
 
5.3 1974−75: Abandoning Monetary Solutions 
 
The referendum defeat, combined with the monetary tightening, meant that at the end of 1973 
the Australian authorities were pursuing a largely orthodox economic package—employing 
monetary restriction rather than price controls—against inflation.  That policy would eventually 
produce dividends in the form of falling inflation from mid-1975.  By then, however, the 
orthodox policy had been abandoned in favor of a framework more closely resembling monetary 
policy neglect.  Several factors explain the abandonment of monetary restraint. 
 
First, the fact that the upsurge in inflation in 1974−75 came in the wake of the 1973 oil price 
shock, and was accompanied by high nominal wage growth, meant that cost-push   22
rationalizations of Australia’s inflation were readily available.  In public debate, these were 
much more readily acceptable explanations than a monetary story, which relied on the lagged 
response of inflation to prior monetary easing, and so required recognition that monetary policy 
exerts its peak effect on inflation after a year or more.  A monetary view of the 1974−75 inflation 
also required explicit recognition of the role of monetary ease in permitting commodity price and 
nominal wage increases to be manifested in movements of the aggregate inflation rate, rather 
than simply in movements in relative prices and the distribution of income.  
 
Second, the fact that the monetary squeeze in 1973−74 was greater than intended—actually 
producing negative growth of M1 in mid-1974—led the Government to be critical of its official 
advice.  Whitlam would later refer to the monetary tightening from September 1973 as a product 
of “faulty advice” from the Treasury and the Reserve Bank (MC, 09/19/77), and “the worst 
decision we ever made” (SMH, 12/03/82).  The flaws he cited in official advice were that the 
tightening “was too late in being introduced, and it was continued too long, until September 
1974” (MC, 09/19/77); and that, when his advisers recommended further demand restraint in 
mid-1974, the level of unemployment they saw as arising from such a policy had in fact already 
been reached (SMH, 12/03/82).  The episode brought home to Whitlam one aspect of the real-
time data problem, as his advisers offered the explanation that delays in receiving economic data 
were a reason why the timing and severity of the 1973−74 tightening had been misjudged.  
Whitlam’s response was to abandon the monetary tightening, reform the collection of statistics, 
and introduce monthly meetings between Cabinet ministers, the Treasury, and Reserve Bank 
officials (MC, 09/19/77; Whitlam, 1979, p. 15).   
 
In retrospect, the Government drew the wrong lessons about real-time data from the episode.  
The abandonment of the monetary tightening replaced overkill in one direction with overkill in 
the other direction—a return to double-digit money growth, rather than simply the end of 
negative money growth.  Whitlam’s reforms to the data-collection process, moreover, were 
predicated on the view that the key problem was the quality of statistics—that if policymakers 
had known in real time that mid-1974 unemployment was approaching 3%, they would have 
seen that the need for demand restraint was over.  In fact, however, a major additional real-time 
problem was that, due to changes in the labor market, the natural rate of unemployment was 
undergoing a permanent shift to levels well above its historical values of below 2 per cent.  The 
Government failed to recognize this; in August 1974, Whitlam referred to unemployment rates of 
3% as “mass unemployment” (DT, 08/27/74), and so interpreted the rise in unemployment to 
such levels and beyond as evidence of a severely negative output gap.  The economy was also 
undergoing a fall in potential GDP growth over this period (Table 2), again misinterpreted (as in 
other countries) as weak demand.  It was not until June 1975 that the Treasurer publicly 
acknowledged that “the minimum level of unemployment will be considerably higher than in the 
past decade” (TA, 06/05/75).  The slowdown in potential growth took even longer to recognize. 
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Third, the sharp rise in unemployment and fall in output during 1974 alongside high inflation 
reinforced the cost-push diagnosis of inflation.  As noted above, the output gap appeared to 
become severely negative at the same time that inflation was in double digits.  This seemed to 
ratify the position that a positive output gap could push inflation higher, but a negative gap had 
little anti-inflationary effect.  Consequently, inflation was attributed to nonmonetary factors; 
disillusionment set in with monetary policy as an anti-inflationary device; and the Government 
shifted its focus to a voluntary incomes policies in fighting inflation. 
 
A foreshadowing of the shift in the Government’s outlook was given by economics columnist 
Alan Wood in March 1974.  He portrayed a scenario where the absence of incomes policy in 
Australia would mean wages in 1974 would catch up with the rapid price inflation of 1973, at the 
same time as the monetary tightening restricted demand, creating “a situation where demand is 
falling away as a result of the success of monetary policy while costs, and hence prices, are 
rising—in short, stagflation” (NT, 03/04/74).  From a monetary perspective on inflation, the kind 
of scenario pictured by Wood can only be a transitory phenomenon: combinations of weak 
demand and rising inflation occur because the inflation response to monetary tightening is slower 
than that of output.  In addition, monetary tightening will limit the extent to which both wages 
and prices can spiral following commodity price increases such as those in 1973.  From the cost-
push perspective popular at the time, however, there is nothing transitory about the combination: 
wage/price spirals can coexist indefinitely alongside arbitrarily negative output gaps. 
 
The position of the Government in the first half of 1974 was that the monetary tightening would 
bring inflation down; for example, Treasurer Crean predicted inflationary expectations would 
taper off as the tightening took effect (DT, 03/25/74), while Trade Minister Cairns, who would 
succeed Crean as Treasurer later in the year, attributed early 1974’s inflation to the monetary 
base expansion permitted by the previous government (AGE, 05/08/74).  As late as June 1974, 
Prime Minister Whitlam reaffirmed the need to “bring demand back into line” with potential 
(TA, 06/08/74).  In July 1974, however, Cairns circulated to his colleagues his revised analysis, 
which argued that excess demand was no longer a source of inflation, and that it was costs 
“where inflation will mainly come from in the future” (NT, 11/18/74).  In light of this analysis, 
and the combination of rising inflation and apparently weak demand predicted by Wood, 
Whitlam himself adopted a strict cost-push diagnosis of inflation.  “I have to be quite frank with 
you,” he said in a televised address to the nation, invoking import-price-push, “inflation will not 
be wholly beaten until there is a worldwide solution” (DT, 08/27/74).  In October 1974 he placed 
emphasis on union wage increases as the source of inflation: “There should be no doubt that this 
severe inflation will continue if there are excessive wage claims” (TA, 10/22/74).   
 
A mini-budget delivered by Whitlam in November 1974 outlined the Government’s change in 
strategy.  He now rejected aggregate demand limitation as an essential ingredient in inflation 
control, instead claiming “[w]hat is needed is a stimulus to the economy which increases   24
demand, whilst at the same time abating cost pressures” (APD, 11/12/74, p. 3360).  To this end, 
he had approved “a very substantial relaxation of monetary policy,” while his statement 
announced cuts in personal income taxes.  He argued that the tax cut would both stimulate 
demand and serve as a direct “attack on inflation, by reducing wage pressures” (p. 3361), since 
disposable incomes could now rise without wage increases.  The Whitlam Government was now 
pursuing a voluntary incomes policy based on a wage/tax-push view of inflation.   
 
Not only did the Government no longer view demand restraint as an essential part of an anti-
inflation program, it now contended that monetary restriction actually promoted inflation.  
Treasurer Cairns said that the shift to negative money growth in 1974 had made unemployment 
and inflation worse because it had been introduced when excess demand was ceasing to be a 
problem (TA, 06/05/75).  The claim that monetary restriction made inflation worse presumably 
reflected an interest-cost-push or unit-cost-push viewpoint.  Whitlam himself contrasted the 
inflation problem of 1973 with that of 1975; the latter, he claimed, was due not to monetary 
factors but “excessive wage and salary demands” (APD, 04/09/75, p. 1364). 
 
5.4 1976−79: Sending Mixed Signals 
 
By the time of its return to office at the end of 1975, the Liberal Party had accepted an important 
role for monetary policy in the control of inflation.
20 Steps to reduce monetary growth were 
announced in January 1976, and targets for growth in a monetary aggregate (M3) commenced in 
March 1976.  In practice, however, inflation in or close to double digits was a problem for the 
whole life of the Government.  Little progress was made in reducing inflation after its first two 
years in office—and, with to the lag between monetary policy actions and inflation, the initial 
reduction is best attributed to the reining in of money growth that occurred in 1973−74 under 
Whitlam.  It was not until 1980 that the Fraser Government’s monetary policy became more 
genuinely anti-inflationary and, again due to lags, this did not deliver a substantial fall in 
inflation until after it lost office in 1983.  The failure to achieve a major monetary tightening 
earlier than 1980 is attributable to its flawed execution of monetary targeting.  The Government 
made two major mistakes that were virtually identical to those that occurred in the early years of 
monetary targeting in the U.K. 
 
The first mistake was a reliance on quantitative controls to achieve the monetary targets.  In 
contrast to Whitlam’s tightening in 1973, open market sales and increases in short-term interest 
rates were typically eschewed in favor of heavy use of reserve-requirement changes.  Indeed, the 
January 1976 package of measures to reduce money growth was accompanied by an announced 
reduction in official short-term rates (AFR, 01/23/76).  In addition, Treasurer Lynch’s outline of 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
20 This contrasts with its position in the first half of the 1970s, when, as noted above, the Liberal Party subscribed to a 
pure wage-push explanation of inflation, and rejected monetary remedies.  Guttmann (2004) documents the evolution 
of its attitudes towards a more monetary view of inflation.   25
the Government’s monetary strategy was interpreted as giving an undertaking that interest rates 
would not rise (SMH, 03/26/76).
21 The Government’s strategy seemed to draw on two valid 
aspects of monetary analysis—that monetary policy works through many channels beside the 
short rate; and that a disinflationary policy would eventually deliver lower nominal rates—to 
arrive at a fallacy: namely, that genuine monetary restriction could be accomplished by a policy 
that did not allow short-term rates to rise.  Its reliance on quantitative controls is reflected in the 
fact that the compulsory cash-reserve requirement was changed 18 times over 1976−79, 
supplemented in 1976 by variations in secondary reserve requirements. 
 
The second mistake was that the authorities shared with their U.K. counterparts an analytical 
framework which Laidler (1989, p. 1152) judges led to “overemphasis on the links between 
fiscal deficits and money creation.”  This framework supported the view that, unless the new 
debt was sold to the nonbank private sector, budget deficits contributed dollar-for-dollar to 
deposit money creation.  The Australian authorities thus convinced themselves that either deficit 
reduction, or moving the holding of government debt from commercial banks to households, 
exerted powerful effects on deposit growth, even though neither such operation has any 
automatic implication for interest rates or base money growth.  By contrast, standard monetary 
analysis states that deficits matter for money growth only to the extent that they affect the 
creation of base money (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 566).
22 The erroneous framework 
adopted by the Government further rationalized the neglect of open market operations in 
exercising monetary control.  For example, The Economist characterized the Government’s 
strategy in 1978 as using deficit control to reduce money growth “without a rise in interest rates” 
(TE, 08/19/78)—this at a time when real interest rates were close to zero. 
 
The Government sent further mixed signals on inflation control because its adoption of monetary 
targeting was by no means accompanied by abandonment of cost-push analysis of inflation.
23 
Both Prime Minister Fraser and Treasurer Lynch believed that wage-tribunal decisions could add 
directly to inflation, with Fraser characterizing them as contributing to “this vicious spiral of 
higher prices, higher money wages, higher costs, and yet more price increases” (DT, 02/14/76), 
and Lynch maintaining that “excessive wage and salary claims remain a direct impetus to more 
inflation” (DM, 02/20/76).  In fact, the Government unsuccessfully attempted in April-May 1977 
to arrange with state governments and wage tribunals a wage-prize freeze (Walsh, 1979, p. 117), 
a measure Fraser claimed would “break the back of inflation” (TE, 04/16/77). 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
21 Guttmann’s (2004) detailed study of the monetary targeting period in Australia provides further examples of the 
authorities’ unwillingness to allow interest rates to increase.  
22 The U.K. and Australian authorities’ line of reasoning was that depriving commercial banks of government bond 
holdings reduces the asset side of their balance sheets, and so promotes a contraction of their liabilities.  This rationale 
confused partial and aggregate balance sheet effects.  With interest rates and their reserve positions unchanged, 
commercial banks have an incentive to respond to reduced government bond holdings by increasing their holdings of 
private debt.  Commercial banks’ asset and liabilities therefore do not change in aggregate.   
23 Again, this advocacy of both monetary targets and cost-push views paralleled developments in the U.K.    26
As Figure 8 indicates, another impediment to tighter monetary policy during this period was a 
still erroneous picture about the state of demand.  In October 1977 The Economist expressed the 
widespread view that “the Australian economy is operating at well below capacity” (TE, 
10/29/77), an assessment that reflected the continued failure to recognize the post-1973 
slowdown in potential GDP.   
 
5.5 1980−82: Moving to a Stricter Rule 
 
Around 1980, the Australian authorities do appear to have shifted to a more genuinely anti-
inflationary stance.  The real ex-post Treasury bill rate was 2.4% in the first ten quarters of the 
1980s, higher than in any ten-quarter period since 1962−64; furthermore, discrepancies between 
actual interest rates and Taylor rule prescriptions became less striking (Figure 5). 
 
Since Australia was ostensibly on a fixed exchange rate during this period, it would be tempting 
to characterize the tighter policy as the authorities joining in with the U.S. monetary restriction in 
order to preserve their exchange-rate target.  However, this characterization is unsustainable, for 
two reasons.  First, as Gruen and Shuetrim (1994, p. 333) note, the nominal exchange rate was 
allowed to fluctuate considerably at a quarterly frequency; the fixed exchange-rate arrangements 
mainly governed day-to-day movements.  Second, as Table 1 shows, the interest rate from 1980 
seems well characterized as responding to domestic variables, including expected CPI inflation.  
It therefore appears appropriate to characterize policy from 1980 as a more restrictive interest-
rate rule, reflecting a belated acceptance that an effective, inflation-oriented monetary policy 
could not be achieved by resort to quantitative or fiscal devices.  This change may have been a 
response to a revival in public debate in the early 1980s of criticism of quantitative controls and 
calls for a more market-oriented monetary policy; in this regard, Guttmann (2004, Ch. 6) quotes 
an official inquiry that took place over 1979−81 as criticizing “inappropriate reliance on direct 
controls” in its final report.  The tighter policy also probably reflected the recognition that 
Australia’s slower growth after 1973 was supply-side in character.   
 
The more inflation-oriented monetary policy from 1980 onward produced lower inflation in 
Australia, which in the decade ending 1992 Q4 averaged 6.3%, 5.4 percentage points lower than 
the prior decade.  This better average performance, however, was poorer than that in other 
countries that underwent a regime shift around 1980, such as the U.S. and the U.K.  The poorer 
performance reflects the fact that inflation in Australia underwent two major revivals, in 
1985−86 and 1988−90.  Each of these revivals reflects temporary lapses by the authorities back 
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5.6 1982−84: Lapse into Monetary Policy Neglect 
 
As in 1974, the early 1980s monetary tightening in Australia was initially felt only in recession, 
while wage and price inflation increased, reflecting delayed responses to past monetary ease.  By 
late 1982, the Fraser Government had reverted to a more stimulative policy on aggregate 
demand, and in October 1982, with four-quarter CPI inflation having reached 12.3%, Prime 
Minister Fraser announced his support for a six-month wage freeze (DM, 10/26/82).  The 
claimed rationale for such a freeze was that it would simultaneously reduce inflation and 
unemployment, and when the Government formally advanced the plan, it estimated that the 
freeze would reduce inflation by six percentage points (AFR, 12/17/82).  The wage freeze was 
agreed to by the state governments and wage tribunals, becoming effective in December 1982.  
Thus, at the end of 1982, Australia was pursuing a stricter incomes policy than it ever had in the 
1970s, and was relying on compulsory controls to attack inflation long after such devices had 
been abandoned in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. 
 
The new Government that took office following Fraser’s election defeat in March 1983 inherited 
an unenviable situation.  The two principal economics ministers, Prime Minister Hawke and 
Treasurer Keating, were the eighth Prime Minister/Treasurer combination since the onset of 
Australia’s Great Inflation, and that inflation problem had now deteriorated in two important 
respects.  On the one hand, the first quarter of 1983 had witnessed simultaneous double-digit 
rates of unemployment and inflation, an unprecedented phenomenon in Australia.  Secondly, 
several OECD countries had brought inflation below 5%, so a challenge to Hawke and Keating 
was whether they could do the same.  They did, though not until 1991.  In the intervening years, 
they would deploy a number of nonmonetary strategies against inflation, and would experience 
for themselves many of the disappointments found in the past with such approaches.  
 
The centerpiece of these nonmonetary tools was the “Accord,” an agreement on wage growth 
between the Government and labor unions.  For a brief period early in the Government’s term, 
Treasurer Keating indicated that this incomes policy would not be used as a substitute for 
aggregate demand policies against inflation; this, however, proved a short-lived position (Kelly, 
1992, p. 66), and Keating was reported in September 1983 as believing that Australia's wage-
fixation system made inflation difficult to control using demand weapons (DM, 09/08/83).  In 
practice, the Government continued Fraser’s policy of monetary expansion, and soon reaffirmed 
its original view of the Accord as a weapon that could help reduce the reliance on demand 
management for inflation control.  In a speech in August 1983, Prime Minister Hawke made it 
clear that he saw incomes policy as an alternative to the “traditional instruments of tighter 
monetary and fiscal policy to restrain inflation” (TA, 09/01/83).  Hawke built on this theme 
further in December 1983: the difference between the Fraser Government’s wage freeze and his 
Government’s Accord policy, he explained, was that the wage freeze was redundant because the 
recession had already frozen wages, whereas the Accord policy intentionally kept nominal wage   28
growth rates below where market forces would normally push them during economic recovery 
(TA, 12/08/83). 
 
Until early 1985, it appeared that the Government’s policy combination was indeed delivering its 
aim of falling inflation alongside aggregate demand expansion.  In January 1985, the 
Government faced a decision on whether to tighten monetary policy after growth in the M3 
aggregate persistently exceeded the target rate.  It was widely accepted that M3 behavior 
reflected distortions from financial innovation, but other monetary aggregates less subject to 
distortion also suggested easy money conditions; while real interest rates, though well above 
1970s values, had been slightly below U.S. levels during most of 1984, even as Australia had 
more serious inflation.  The Government’s decision to drop the monetary target, and not tighten 
monetary policy at all, was applauded by the Sydney Morning Herald in an editorial: 
“[M]onetary policy is anything but loose.  Any further tightening of monetary policy… would be 
more likely to fuel inflation than control it… [because with] the Accord, the Government has 
promised to deliver employment and economic growth” (SMH, 01/30/85).  Thus, three years 
after monetary policy had produced disinflation in major economies, and over a decade after the 
heyday of doubts about the effectiveness of monetary policy, the argument that monetary 
tightening worsened inflation was still being prominently advanced in Australian policy debate. 
 
5.7 1985−91: Discarding the Nonmonetary Framework 
 
The position that monetary policy was already tight, and that further tightening would re-launch 
inflation, was not borne out by developments in the rest of 1985.  Faced with a resurgence of 
inflation, the Government tightened monetary policy from February 1985.  The up-tick in 
inflation was blamed on a cost-push event—a sudden exchange rate depreciation.  Other 
episodes, however, do not bear this explanation out: a large depreciation in 1997−98 was not 
followed by a revival of CPI inflation.  The 1985 inflation surge instead appears to be a delayed 
response to the lapse into easier monetary policy over 1982−84.  From 1985 the Government 
adhered to a more anti-inflationary interest-rate rule closer to that prevailing in the early 1980s.  
That monetary policy was tightened when inflation rose, despite the continuing prevalence of 
cost-push views among policymakers, reflects the import-price push diagnosis of the inflation 
outbreak.  Even from a cost-push perspective, monetary tightening is the appropriate response to 
rising inflation if the rise is believed to have come from exchange rate depreciation. 
 
In contrast to the fears expressed earlier in 1985, monetary tightening did not produce a wage-
price spiral.  Price inflation receded in 1987−88, reflecting a delayed reaction to the 1985−86 
tightening; while wage inflation was lower still, in part reflecting continuing attempts by the 
Government to use control of wages as an anti-inflationary weapon. To this end, the Government 
negotiated over 1985−86 a trade-off between nominal wage increases and tax cuts, reflecting a 
more binding version of Whitlam’s proposals in 1974.  By this stage, most other countries had   29
abandoned or de-emphasized incomes policy in inflation control, but many commentators within 
Australia saw those abandonments as an aberration.  The Sydney Morning Herald economics 
editor, for example, asked: “How long before [U.K. policymakers’] search for the Holy Grail 
leads them back to incomes policy?” (SMH, 03/26/88). 
 
Contrary to their aim, however, the 1980s incomes policies in Australia appear to have 
contributed little or nothing to the control of inflation.  Price inflation in the 1980s behaved 
dissimilarly to wage inflation; as one of Keating’s subsequent advisers observed, incomes policy 
appeared “extremely successful in restraining the growth of wages but not of inflation” 
(Edwards, 1996, p. 282).  Policymakers attributed this failure first to import-price-push, and then 
to profit-push.  In fact, however, it appears that it was the absence of monetary restraint that 




Apparently satisfied that inflation control had been satisfactorily delegated to other devices, the 
authorities permitted another period of monetary ease over 1987−88, an easing reflected in a 
surge in inflation over 1988−90.  1988 also brought a new series of nonmonetary initiatives 
against inflation.  Many of them were introduced in the August 1988 Budget, as a newspaper 
report recorded: “The Budget’s anti-inflationary strategy hinges on lower indirect taxes, mainly 
for beer drinkers, and a delay in personal tax cuts… [T]he size of the [income tax] cuts will 
depend on the second wage/tax trade-off…” (TA, 08/24/88).  Reflecting on these measures, 
Treasurer Keating remarked: “Having succeeded in bringing down the inflation rate of 11 per 
cent under the Liberal Party to 5 per cent in 1985, and having watched inflation rise to 10 per 
cent as a result of a big depreciation of the exchange rate, we are now succeeding in bringing it 
back to the 5 per cent area whence it came in 1985... Inflation is declining” (APD, 11/30/88, p. 
3547).  But instead of declining after the August 1988 Budget, inflation rose from its 1988 Q1 
trough of 6.9%, and ended the 1980s at a four-quarter rate of 7.8%.  
 
1988 did also witness a major monetary policy tightening.  The tightening itself was motivated 
by balance-of-payments rather than inflation considerations.  The fall in inflation that it 
produced, however, did transform the views of policymakers and observers about the role of 
monetary policy in inflation control.  As late as 1990, the Governor of the Reserve Bank rejected 
central-bank inflation targeting as infeasible in Australia, and cited the need for other tools such 
as wages policy (AFR, 10/18/90).  When inflation fell below 5% in early 1991—clearly a 
response to the period of monetary restraint—Treasurer Keating spoke publicly about low 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
24 For the period of strictest wage control, 1983−89, the correlation of CPI inflation and growth in average nominal 
wages is −0.22; the maximum positive correlation of inflation with prior wage growth is 0.42 (inflation and wage 
growth one year earlier).  By contrast, the maximum correlation of inflation and money (currency) growth is 0.61 
(inflation and money growth two years earlier).  Another measure of monetary ease—the excess of the Taylor rule 
prescriptions in Figure 5 over actual short rates—leads inflation over 1983−89 by one year, with a correlation of 0.85.    30
inflation as the criterion by which macroeconomic policy should be judged (Edwards, 1996, p. 
405).  Gruen and Stevens (2000, p. 52) record that in the 1990s, “the main insight of two 
centuries of monetary economics… that monetary policy ultimately determined inflation” 
convinced the authorities that nonmonetary approaches to inflation control should be abandoned 
in favor of central-bank inflation targeting. 
   
6.  New Zealand 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, decisions on monetary policy were the responsibility of the New 
Zealand Treasury, headed by the Minister of Finance.  In May 1970, Finance Minister Robert 
Muldoon rejected private estimates that inflation in New Zealand, which currently stood at a 
four-quarter rate of about 4.3%, might reach 9 per cent later in the year.  Muldoon noted that 
New Zealand’s experience was of lower inflation than in Japan, the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. 
(EP, 05/06/70).  Building on this comparison, in July 1970 Muldoon said that “countries which 
fail to hold inflation will suffer in comparison with those which are successful.  This is the 
test…” (EP, 07/21/70).  Over the following fifteen years, during which Muldoon totaled eleven 
more years as Minister of Finance, New Zealand would perform poorly by this test.  In 1985, 
New Zealand’s CPI averaged 5.7 times its 1970 value, compared to 2.7 in Japan, 2.8 in the U.S., 
3.1 in Canada, 4.1 in Australia, and 5.0 in the U.K.  The deterioration reflected repeated 
application by the New Zealand authorities of the policy combination associated with monetary 
policy neglect—direct controls on wages and prices accompanied by monetary expansion. 
 
6.1 1970−72: Rival Spiral Theories 
 
Macroeconomic policy debates over 1970−72 in New Zealand had similarities to those in 
Australia.  In both countries, the conservative government blamed inflation on wage-push, while 
the opposition party claimed inflation was a side-effect of the government’s monetary and fiscal 
policies.  There were two major differences on both sides from the Australian situation.  First, 
the Opposition in Australia had attributed part of the inflation breakout to over-expansionary 
policies by the Government, while in New Zealand the Opposition’s analysis was more rigidly 
cost-push.  Secondly, unlike its Australian counterpart, the New Zealand Government had the 
constitutional authority to impose direct wage and price controls, which consequently formed a 
major part of its inflation-control policies from 1970 onward. 
 
The Government had predicted in mid-1970 that inflation for the full year would be a little over 
4% (EP, 05/29/70).  By the end of 1970, four-quarter CPI inflation was instead moving into 
double digits.  Finance Minister Muldoon blamed the increase on “a wage/price spiral caused… 
by the stronger and more militant unions” (NZPD, 06/25/70, p. 1298), while the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand’s Annual Report similarly judged that “[t]he ‘cost-push’ type of inflation now 
seems to be dominant” (1970, p. 7).  The Government imposed a three-month wage-price freeze   31
in November 1970, and negotiated with unions for a voluntary wages policy to follow the freeze.  
After the negotiations failed, the Government introduced a compulsory wages policy 
accompanied by continued monitoring of prices.  
 
Speaking when the wage-control legislation was introduced, Prime Minister Holyoake denied 
that the Government had attacked only the “symptoms” of inflation.  Rather, he claimed that the 
Government had also taken “steps… to attack the causes of inflation… by dampening down the 
economy” (NZPD, 02/26/71, p. 22).  The list of steps Holyoake provided, however, contained 
few items that would remove monetary excess from the economy.  Two items in his list—
increases in payroll tax and in secondary reserve requirements—did not necessarily put 
downward pressure on money growth.  Holyoake’s list did contain some ostensibly more 
relevant measures—increases in cash-reserve requirements for financial institutions, and some 
selective, modest increases in the central bank’s lending rates.  By the early 1970s, however, 
quantitative regulations such as cash-reserve requirements were considerably less effective than 
open market operations in inducing monetary tightness, because of the growth of an unregulated 
banking sector in New Zealand (ACR, 10/12/73).  In any case, the failure to back the reserve-
requirement increases with substantial increases in interest rates guaranteed the ineffectiveness 
of the measures, since the result was a situation where extra base money would be created to 
meet all of the greater demand for reserves by intermediaries.  Holyoake also made it clear that 
he did not think excess demand was still the problem; instead it was that “the wage-cost push, the 
cost spiral, is still continuing” despite restraint on demand (NZPD, 02/26/71, p. 23).  
 
The Opposition, headed by Labour Party Leader Norman Kirk, had its own cost-push diagnosis 
of inflation.  Kirk rejected the wage-push explanation on the grounds that “wages and salaries 
were increased because costs and prices had increased” (NZPD, 06/15/71, p. 853).  Instead he 
blamed a “cost-tax-price spiral” initiated by Government tax increases (NZPD, 06/15/71, p. 854).  
The Government and Opposition thus had rival “spiral” theories of inflation—a wage-price spiral 
vs. a cost-tax-price spiral—neither of them consistent with a monetary explanation. 
 
Kirk also endorsed the unit-cost-push argument that demand restriction worsened inflation: 
“Inflation itself is a by-product of the undermining process the Government has followed.  
Stagnation is a cause of inflation… [by] compelling factories to run at less than full capacity so 
that the unit cost remains high but the volume of output falls… If we want to cure inflation, we 
must first increase production” (NZPD, 06/14/72, pp. 116−117).  In fact, even the premise of 
Kirk’s argument—that demand was weak—appears questionable on the basis of today’s revised 
data.  They suggest that output returned to its long-run trend during 1971, and moved well above 
it in 1972 (Figure 9). 
 
The Government, however, by 1972 shared Kirk’s view that the output gap had gone negative.  
This perceived deterioration had occurred alongside continued double-digit inflation through   32
most of 1971, so the Government’s cost-push diagnosis was reinforced.  The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand claimed that in “a period of ‘stagflation’ (a low rate of real growth combined with 
strongly rising prices) such as New Zealand has been experiencing… orthodox monetary policy 
is of subsidiary importance” (1972, p. 7).  Similarly, Muldoon, while not yet taking Kirk’s 
position that tightening worsened inflation, claimed that recent overseas attempts to fight 
inflation with monetary restriction had raised unemployment without reducing inflation (NZPD, 
06/10/71, p. 785). 
 
In light of these judgments, the Government in March 1972 increased its range of direct 
controls—imposing stricter controls over firms’ price decisions, freezes on prices of government 
output, and limits on dividend income (NZPD, 06/22/72, pp. 391−392).  The Government also 
consciously stimulated the economy, with forced reductions in bank interest rates, and monetary 
and fiscal expansion.  Like its U.K. and Australian counterparts, the Government believed that 
pressure on inflation from demand only began when the economy reached full employment, a 
point Muldoon regarded as far off given the “unused capacity in the economy” (NZPD, 06/22/72, 
p. 409). 
 
The timing of Muldoon’s policy loosening was far from appropriate as, like Australia, New 
Zealand had started a period of tremendous increases in the monetary base due to large inflows 
of foreign capital and export earnings.  Muldoon’s monetary easing was a response to the more 
restrained pre-1972 demand environment, which the external developments had already replaced 
with boom conditions.  The earlier period of weaker demand, as well as the controls imposed by 
the Government, nevertheless secured a fall of inflation to just above 5% by the end of 1972.  
 
6.2 1972−75: Labour Government 
 
The National Party administration was defeated at the election of November 1972, and was 
succeeded by a Labour Government led by Norman Kirk.  The Government was immediately 
faced with a revival of inflation, which in the first quarter of 1973 returned to double-digit 
annualized rates.  The authorities took a strict cost-push interpretation of the increase.  Presenting 
the Government’s first Budget, Finance Minister Rowling acknowledged that “inflation has 
become the number one problem” (NZPD, 06/14/73, p. 1353), but insisted that “short-term 
economic management must keep the economy running close to full capacity” (p. 1349).  To this 
end, the Government actually cut the Treasury bill rate by 50 basis points to 2% in May 1973 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1974, p. 18).  The measures Rowling outlined to “contain the 
inflationary pressures which are apparent” (p. 1349) consisted of interventions in the markets for 
particular goods.  The National Party Opposition also saw the solution in direct controls, with 
Opposition Leader Marshall beginning his critique of the 1973 Budget with the statement: “This 
is an inflation Budget.  There is no serious attempt to produce an incomes policy...” (NZPD, 
06/19/73, p. 1425).   33
Prime Minister Kirk returned from an overseas visit in August 1973 claiming inflation was a 
mystery: “So far, nobody has been able to say what is causing inflation, let alone suggest a 
remedy for it” (EP, 08/16/73).  His own account of New Zealand’s inflation was that “living 
costs have risen because of the price of meat” (NZPD, 09/01/73, p. 3422).  In addition, he 
blamed import-price-push: “we are also feeling the effect of inflation in the Northern 
Hemisphere through a sharp and very severe rise in the prices of our imports.”  The import-price-
push analysis would produce the main monetary tightening of the year—the exchange-rate 
revaluation in September 1973. 
 
New Zealand’s announcement of a 10% revaluation was synchronized with the revaluation 
taking place in Australia.  However, in contrast to the statement by Prime Minister Whitlam in 
Australia, which had mentioned the need to curb money growth, Kirk’s rationale for the 
revaluation concentrated on the import-price-reducing aspects of the action. “The increasing cost 
of imports and the higher prices of meat and other goods which we export have been major 
causes of the rising cost of living in New Zealand… A major threat to cost and price stability that 
we face now is the surge of inflation reaching New Zealand from abroad,” he told a press 
conference.  He argued that the revaluation would be anti-inflationary via “a reduction… in the 
cost of imported goods and of those export commodities whose prices tend to be determined in 
overseas markets… [with] further benefits as these price effects work their way through the 
national cost structure” (CP, 09/10/73). 
 
Other than a brief reference to the strength of New Zealand’s overseas reserves, the implications 
of the revaluation for monetary and aggregate demand conditions went unmentioned by Kirk, 
even though, from the perspective of a monetary view of inflation, these were the most important 
aspects of the policy action.  The New Zealand Herald’s editorial also evaluated revaluation on 
cost-push criteria, judging that the effect on inflation would be less than 2 per cent, on the 
grounds that this was the weighted effect of a 10 per cent reduction in import prices (NZH, 
09/10/73a).  The editorial did not deal with aggregate-demand aspects of the devaluation, 
although an analysis by a Herald reporter did mention briefly that the devaluation was useful 
because “New Zealand should be running down its overseas reserves, which are too high and are 
part of the cause of the inflationary gap between goods and incomes” (NZH, 09/10/73b).  
 
Consistent with the Government’s rejection of excess demand as a source of inflation, Kirk’s 
revaluation announcement was not, unlike that in Australia, accompanied by interest-rate 
increases; rather, Kirk introduced a range of new controls on the prices and export of agricultural 
goods prices (NZH, 09/10/73c).  The four-quarter rate of CPI inflation nevertheless ended 1973 
at 10%, nearly double its value a year earlier.  Finance Minister Rowling attributed the increase 
in the inflation rate during 1973 to “three major factors: meat prices, governed by overseas 
realizations; fruit and vegetable prices, governed by the weather in this country; and import 
prices, governed by other people’s costs.  None of these things comes very directly within the   34
control of the Government” (NZPD, 06/05/74, p. 1642).  Symmetrically, he characterized the 
Government’s ability to arrest inflation as limited to its scope for affecting these prices directly; 
and, to this end, listed the actions taken to fight inflation as the exchange-rate revaluation and a 
new subsidy for sheep-meat prices.  Confirming that he did not see an excess-demand dimension 
to the problem, Rowling said the Government deserved credit for “keep[ing] the economy 
moving forward at a very rapid pace” while fighting inflation (NZPD, 06/05/74, p. 1642). 
 
Like their Australian counterparts, the authorities turned later in 1974 to blaming domestic wage-
push for inflation.  The Government (now led by Rowling after Kirk’s death) introduced new, 
compulsory controls on wage growth and in 1975 negotiated wage agreements with the leading 
labor-union body (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1975, p. 8).  In his 1975 Budget, Finance 
Minister Tizard claimed that “an effective incomes policy is crucial in the current economic 
situation… a relaxation of controls on wage bargaining is directly dependent on a moderation of 
our present inflation” (NZPD, 05/22/75, p. 1295).  Prime Minister Rowling rejected a contraction 
of demand on the grounds that it had been tried overseas and had caused unemployment with 
little effect on inflation.  Instead, he pledged that the Government would “ensure that there is the 
least possible disruption to sustained economic growth and employment” (EP, 12/03/74). 
 
6.3 1976−79: Misleading Austerity 
 
Following the Rowling Government’s defeat in the November 1975 election, the National Party 
returned to office, now led by Robert Muldoon who, in addition to becoming Prime Minister, 
resumed his former position of Minister of Finance.  Throughout his term in office, Muldoon 
maintained cost-push views of inflation.  He nevertheless consciously pursued a policy of zero 
real GDP growth in 1976; the rationale for this strategy was to improve the current account 
balance rather than inflation (CP, 01/13/82).  The Government announced in March 1976 a 
number of measures designed to tighten monetary policy, including a 100 basis point increase in 
Treasury bill rates to 4 per cent (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1976, p. 14).  With inflation at 
over 15 per cent, this still implied highly negative real rates.  Real rates were nevertheless less 
negative than they had been in 1975, and this, along with the slowdown of reserve and deposit 
growth that had occurred after 1973, produced somewhat more restrained monetary conditions in 
the mid-1970s than had prevailed earlier in the decade. 
 
With the tighter conditions, a slowdown in the economy did occur over 1976−77, and this 
slowdown, in turn, accounts for the decline in inflation to around 10 per cent in late 1978.  The 
reason why inflation did not fall further is that in terms of excess demand, the measures to 
restrict demand were nowhere as austere as thought at the time, because potential output growth 
had undergone a particularly severe slowdown (Table 2).  As in other countries, the authorities 
were slow to recognize the reduced growth of supply; and, again as in other countries, in the 
meantime they observed protracted periods of high inflation and negative output gaps, seemingly   35
confirming cost-push views of inflation.  It was not until 1978 that the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand made it clear that “New Zealand’s slow growth reflects fundamental structural factors” 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1978, p. 7). 
 
Growing recognition of the productivity slowdown had no effect on the Muldoon Government’s 
adherence to nonmonetary views on inflation.  Muldoon imposed a four-month freeze on prices 
in late 1976; when inflation continued after the freeze’s removal, he claimed, “Two main factors 
are maintaining the present inflationary momentum.  These are import prices and wages” 
(NZPD, 07/21/77, p. 1525).  Giving little priority to monetary policy in his anti-inflation 
strategy, Muldoon allowed policy to ease during 1978, and by the end of the 1970s, inflation was 
close to its 1970s peak of 17 per cent. 
 
6.4 1980−84: Reaffirming Nonmonetary Approaches 
 
In January 1980, while several major economies were assigning a central role to monetary policy 
in fighting inflation, the Muldoon Government continued to adhere to the view that inflation was 
largely beyond the reach of macroeconomic policy.  “New Zealand is, of course, still vulnerable 
to overseas influences, particularly oil prices, and to domestic factors, such as wage increases,” 
Muldoon said.  “What happens to prices over the coming year will be determined largely by 
these two factors” (CP, 01/14/80).  Shortly afterward, four-quarter CPI inflation reached a 
peacetime peak of over 18 per cent, a rate which Muldoon claimed was “almost entirely” due to 
the second oil shock (AST, 10/02/81). 
 
While disagreements did exist about aspects of Muldoon’s macroeconomic strategy, the 
nonmonetary analysis of inflation underlying the Muldoon approach continued to command 
substantial support in the early 1980s.  A 1980 critique of Muldoon’s inflation strategy by 
Opposition Leader Rowling rested on a nonmonetary approach: Rowling called for limitations on 
the prices of government services, increased monitoring of private-sector pricing decisions, and 
intervention in securities markets to bring down interest rates (NZH, 01/14/80).  Similarly, an 
academic economist, J.D. Gould, observed in June 1982: “Milton Friedman, a leading exponent 
of the monetarist view, was in New Zealand last year trying to persuade us that ‘inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.’  Only a minority of New Zealand economists 
unreservedly share this view… Probably most New Zealand economists hold an eclectic view, 
seeing inflation as the outcome of an ‘interactive’ process in which both trade unions and the 
money supply (and the government deficits which fuel it) play a part, but which also depends on 
other elements of New Zealand’s economic structure.”  The “other elements” listed by Gould 
included a number of factors prominent in cost-push explanations of inflation, such as 
indexation, wage-fixing arrangements in the government sector, corporate monopoly power, and 
successive exchange-rate devaluations (CP, 06/30/82). 
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The wage-push diagnosis of inflation led the Muldoon Government to attempt to negotiate a 
wage/tax trade-off with trade unions over 1981−82.
25 When these negotiations broke down, 
Muldoon imposed a one-year wage-price freeze.  Muldoon’s justification for the freeze cited 
declining inflation in most major OECD countries.  “Rates of inflation in most of these countries 
are declining…  These countries are major suppliers of products to New Zealand.  The rate of 
price increases in the goods that we import is also steadily declining.  The price of oil is expected 
to decline in real terms throughout the remainder of this year… All of these things give us a 
unique opportunity to reduce New Zealand’s rate of inflation…” (NZH, 06/23/82). 
 
The political reaction to the controls announcement was a watershed, reflecting the increased 
role since 1980 for conventional economic analysis in New Zealand debate.  In contrast to prior 
years, in which opposition parties frequently responded to government control measures with 
incomes-policy proposals of their own, Opposition Leader Rowling gave an orthodox critique of 
Muldoon’s freeze: 
 
  The wages and prices freeze will not work… After all, in the year A.D. 301, a little before the 
Minister of Finance’s time, but not before the policies adopted by the present Government—
that dates the policies—the Emperor Diocletian introduced a price freeze with the death 
penalty for non-compliance, and it still did not work.  There is no way in which it will work in 
1982, any more than it [c]ould in A.D. 301, because such a proposition resolves absolutely 
nothing. (NZPD, 07/20/82, p. 1199). 
 
Similarly, Rowling’s successor as Labour Party leader, David Lange, said that New Zealand’s 
trading partners had reduced inflation by tightening monetary policy, while Muldoon’s 
Government had undertaken no such attack on the causes of inflation (CP, 07/11/83).  
 
For his part, Muldoon in his 1983 Budget claimed that “monetary restraint” had accompanied the 
wage-price freeze (NZPD, 07/28/83, p. 891).  The actual record, however, suggests that the 
opposite was the case—the Government was exercising monetary policy neglect by substituting 
direct controls for monetary restraint.  Muldoon made it clear that he had no intention of reining 
in demand during the freeze: “I would think that we should be able to keep the general level of 
economic activity high enough that there should be no big increase in unemployment” (CP, 
12/28/82).  The freeze itself prohibited increases in the interest rates charged by financial 
intermediaries, and the Government’s own actions on interest rates turned in an even more 
expansionary direction.  In July 1983, for example, Muldoon reduced the interest rate on three-
month Treasury bills from 12 to 7.8 per cent, and indicated that he would impose regulations on 
financial institutions if they did not cut rates on private loans by commensurate amounts 
(Gustafson, 2000, p. 350; AST, 07/30/83). 
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
25 The Reserve Bank Governor also voiced support for an incomes policy, stating: “I don’t believe inflation, which is 
well-entrenched and is being encouraged by the close linkage between costs and prices, can be overcome solely by 
tight monetary and fiscal policies” (NZH, 02/13/82).   37
The evolution of macroeconomic policies during the freeze thus confirmed a fear expressed by 
Don Brash, later head of the central bank, but in 1982 a newspaper columnist.  At the time of the 
freeze’s imposition, Brash worried that the worst side-effect of the freeze would be that it would 
“fool people into believing that something is actually being achieved in the reduction of 
inflation,” at the same time that the Government did nothing to reduce monetary growth (AS, 
06/23/82).  The appearance of success proceeded as the four-quarter CPI inflation rate fell into 
single digits in mid-1983, troughing at 3.5 per cent at the end of the year, by which time the 
freeze had been extended to February 1984.  A member of Muldoon’s Cabinet, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Cooper, declared victory: the Government, he said, was the first in the history of 
Western civilization to have cured inflation successfully via a wage-price freeze (CP, 09/17/83).  
 
A more sober perspective was offered by a private economist, Len Bayliss, who said that 
experience showed that wage-price freezes suppressed inflation for 18 months to two years 
before losing their effectiveness (CP, 04/15/83).  This judgment proved accurate in July 1984, 
when CPI data for the first post-freeze quarter revealed that prices had jumped by 2.2 per cent 
(CP, 07/10/84).  Shortly afterwards, the Muldoon Government suffered electoral defeat. 
 
6.5 1984−90: From Price Controls to Inflation Targets  
 
Immediately upon taking office, the Labour Government abolished Muldoon’s controls on 
interest rates, and tightened monetary policy.  Short-term interest rates increased sharply, and 
from 1985 took positive real values for the first time (excluding the freeze period) since 1969.  
Finance Minister Douglas justified the interest-rate increases on the grounds that they would 
“assist in keeping both inflationary pressure and inflationary expectations down” (CP, 08/03/84), 
a contrary judgment to that of defeated Prime Minister Muldoon, who deplored the changes on 
interest-cost-push grounds (CP, 07/19/84).  Given the lagged response of inflation to monetary 
policy actions, the monetary policy tightening begun in 1984 did not prevent higher inflation 
over 1985−87—a rise reflecting the earlier period of ease, the removal of remaining price 
controls, and the impact effect of higher indirect taxation.  Inflation did, however fall into single 
digits at the end of 1987, and the four-quarter rate fell below 5 per cent at the end of 1988.  Also 
in 1988, the Government appointed Don Brash as Governor of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand.  Brash’s view of the record of controls was negative: “literally hundreds of 
governments, of all political persuasions and in all parts of the world, have tried to reduce 
inflation by direct controls.  There is no case where controls alone succeeded” (AST, 06/23/82).
26 
Over 1989−90 the authorities cemented the delegation of inflation control in New Zealand to 
monetary policy through their much-discussed launch of inflation targeting (see e.g. Debelle, 
1996, pp. 60−62; Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999, Ch. 5). 
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
26 Similarly, Brash judged that other nonmonetary devices such as wage/tax trade-offs had “a negligible impact on 
inflation” (AST, 06/17/82).   38
7.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this paper indicates that the course of macroeconomic policy during the Great 
Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand shared six common features. 
 
First, policymakers at least from 1971 viewed inflation as resulting from factors beyond their 
control, not as a consequence of their monetary policy decisions.  This rules out explanations of 
the Great Inflation which characterize the monetary authority as consciously choosing the 
inflation rate to achieve certain outcomes for real variables, or as part of an optimization 
exercise.  Such explanations include those used in the time-consistency literature, and also 
accounts that rely on a government belief in a permanent trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation.  The record of policymakers’ views is, however, consistent with the monetary policy 
neglect hypothesis. 
 
Second, policymakers embraced nonmonetary approaches against inflation in a manner that 
defied political classification.  In the total of five countries studied here and in Nelson (2004), 
the highly interventionist strategy of compulsory wage and price controls was adopted by the 
traditionally more anti-interventionist of the major political parties.  Not only did conservative 
governments in the U.S. and the U.K. introduce compulsory price controls; but in Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, the anti-conservative governments in power in 1973 came under 
criticism from the conservative opposition parties for not imposing compulsory controls.  And 
when conservative parties returned to power in Australia and New Zealand, they did eventually 
impose controls more severe than seen previously. 
 
Third, nonmonetary theories of inflation were not espoused simply for “political cover” by 
policymakers who, in truth, understood the monetary character of inflation.  Cost-push analysis 
dominated the analysis used in governments’ internal discussions.  And many critics of 
government policy in the financial community, academia, and media used cost-push analysis too. 
 
Fourth, nonmonetary actions against inflation were accompanied by monetary expansion, not 
restraint.  Occasionally policymakers verbally acknowledged the need for monetary restriction to 
complement incomes policies, but in practice they did not follow such a combination.  On other 
occasions, they were quite explicit that they intended to stimulate or maintain aggregate demand 
while delegating inflation control to other devices. 
 
Fifth, output-gap mismeasurement reinforced the tendency for monetary policy neglect.  The 
belief that inflation behavior was proceeding in spite of negative output gaps motivated the shift 
to nonmonetary theories of inflation; and once nonmonetary devices against inflation had been 
deployed, the desire to eliminate output gaps justified monetary expansion. 
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Sixth, the monetary policy regime change that produced disinflation did not always coincide 
with a rejection of the nonmonetary view of the inflation process.  In the U.K. and New Zealand, 
the adoption of firmer monetary policies did coincide with the election of governments which 
took a monetary view of inflation.  In Australia, Canada, and the U.S., however, the monetary 
changes were triggered either by cost-push considerations (i.e., fear of exchange rate 
depreciation in Canada and the U.S.) or factors beside inflation (i.e., balance-of-payments 
considerations in Australia).  The disinflations that followed, however, converted policymakers 
in these three countries to a monetary view of inflation.   40
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Appendix 3.  Construction of Real-Time Output Gaps in Figures 7−9 
 
The 1977 Canadian output gap in Figure 7 is an approximation of the series used (but not reported) 
in McCracken et al (1977).  This approximation is obtained first by using the annual data on real 
GDP for Canada in IFS (June 1977).  A potential GDP series for Canada, designed to match that 
used by McCracken et al, was then deduced from the information given in McCracken et al (1977, 
p. 319) and Laidler (1978), i.e. 5% annual growth in potential output, and only one year (1973) in 
the 1970s during which output exceeded potential.  For Australia and New Zealand, the 1977 gap 
estimate is obtained by detrending the log of the 1977 vintage of real GDP from IFS, with the trend 
estimated on annual data for 1957−73. This is intended as an approximation of how policymakers 
in 1977 estimated potential GDP; Gruen, Robinson, and Stone (2002) express doubt that the actual 
estimates of potential made by policymakers can be recovered for Australia, and the same is true of 
New Zealand.    46
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